CERTA-2006-AVI-472
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2006-11-06 - Updated: 2006-11-06None
Description
Plusieurs vulnérabilités ont été identifiées dans les produits Sophos, dont Sophos Anti-Virus. Parmi celles-ci, l'une affecterait le module Petite, qui gère les fichiers compressés par l'application du même nom. D'autres seraient dues à une mauvaise manipulation de documents au format RAR ou CHM (fichiers d'aide Microsoft).
Une personne malveillante pourrait construire un document exploitant l'une de ces vulnérabilités, afin de perturber le système possédant une version de Sophos vulnérable, et empêchant ainsi le service de fonctionner correctement.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur Sophos pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sophos | N/A | Sophos Anti-Virus Mac OS X, pour la version 4.8.5, ainsi que celles antérieures ; | ||
| Sophos | N/A | Sophos Anti-Virus 4.X, pour la version 4.11, ainsi que celles antérieures ; | ||
| Sophos | N/A | Sophos Anti-Virus 6.X, pour la version 6.0.5 ainsi que celles antérieures ; | ||
| Sophos | N/A | Sophos Endpoint Security, pour la version 6.0.5 ainsi que celles antérieures. |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Sophos Anti-Virus Mac OS X, pour la version 4.8.5, ainsi que celles ant\u00e9rieures ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Sophos",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Sophos Anti-Virus 4.X, pour la version 4.11, ainsi que celles ant\u00e9rieures ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Sophos",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Sophos Anti-Virus 6.X, pour la version 6.0.5 ainsi que celles ant\u00e9rieures ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Sophos",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Sophos Endpoint Security, pour la version 6.0.5 ainsi que celles ant\u00e9rieures.",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Sophos",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nPlusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9es dans les produits Sophos,\ndont Sophos Anti-Virus. Parmi celles-ci, l\u0027une affecterait le module\nPetite, qui g\u00e8re les fichiers compress\u00e9s par l\u0027application du m\u00eame nom.\nD\u0027autres seraient dues \u00e0 une mauvaise manipulation de documents au\nformat RAR ou CHM (fichiers d\u0027aide Microsoft).\n\nUne personne malveillante pourrait construire un document exploitant\nl\u0027une de ces vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s, afin de perturber le syst\u00e8me poss\u00e9dant une\nversion de Sophos vuln\u00e9rable, et emp\u00eachant ainsi le service de\nfonctionner correctement.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur Sophos pour l\u0027obtention\ndes correctifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2006-4839",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-4839"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2006-11-06T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2006-11-06T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 iDefense du 31 octobre 2006 :",
"url": "http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/display.php?id=438"
},
{
"title": "Article Sophos du 0\u00e9 novembre 2006, issu de la Base de Connaissances :",
"url": "http://www.sophos.fr/support/knowledgebase/article/7618.html"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2006-AVI-472",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2006-11-06T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
}
],
"summary": null,
"title": "Plusieurs vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans les produits Sophos",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Article de Sophos du 02 novembre 2006",
"url": null
}
]
}
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