CERTA-2006-AVI-455
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2006-10-16 - Updated: 2006-10-16
Une vulnérabilité dans mod_tcl permet à un utilisateur malveillant distant d'exécuter du code arbitraire.
Description
mod_tcl est un module pour le serveur web Apache permettant la mise en œuvre de scripts au langage TCL dans le contexte d'un serveur web Apache. Une erreur de type chaîne de format dans ce module permet à un utilisateur distant d'exécuter du code arbitraire par le biais d'une requête construite de façon particulière.
Solution
La version 1.0.1 de mod_tcl pour Apache 2.x corrige le problème :
http://tcl.apache.org/mod_tcl
mod_tcl versions 1.0 et antérieures pour Apache version 2.x.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
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{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cTT\u003emod_tcl\u003c/TT\u003e versions 1.0 et ant\u00e9rieures pour Apache version 2.x.",
"content": "## Description\n\nmod_tcl est un module pour le serveur web Apache permettant la mise en\n\u0153uvre de scripts au langage TCL dans le contexte d\u0027un serveur web\nApache. Une erreur de type cha\u00eene de format dans ce module permet \u00e0 un\nutilisateur distant d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire par le biais d\u0027une\nrequ\u00eate construite de fa\u00e7on particuli\u00e8re.\n\n## Solution\n\nLa version 1.0.1 de mod_tcl pour Apache 2.x corrige le probl\u00e8me :\n\n http://tcl.apache.org/mod_tcl\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2006-4154",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-4154"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2006-10-16T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2006-10-16T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Site de mod_tcl :",
"url": "http://tcl.apache.org/mod_tcl"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2006-AVI-455",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2006-10-16T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans mod_tcl permet \u00e0 un utilisateur malveillant\ndistant d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 du module mod_tcl de Apache",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 iDefense du 13 octobre 2006",
"url": "http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=421"
}
]
}
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