CERTA-2006-AVI-436
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2006-10-11 - Updated: 2006-10-11None
Description
Une vulnérabilité de type injection de code indirecte (cross-site scripting) a été identifiée dans le composant .NET version 2.0 de Microsoft Windows. Ce composant a pour objectif d'aider à concevoir des applications Windows, en gérant certains aspects au cours de son exécution (allocation de la mémoire, gestion des droits, etc).
Cette vulnérabilité permettrait à une personne malveillante de contourner la politique de sécurité et d'accéder à des informations sans autorisation préalable. Il lui faut pour cela inciter l'utilisateur à visiter une page Web spécialement construite : quand le script sera exécuté par le navigateur de ce dernier, de l'information pourrait lui être dérobée.
Cette vulnérabilité de fonctionne que si le paramètre de contrôle AutoPostBack de .NET Framework 2.0 a pour valeur True. Ce n'est pas le cas par défaut.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité MS06-056 de l'éditeur Microsoft pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Microsoft .NET Framework version 2.0 pour les systèmes d'exploitation suivants :
- Microsoft Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 ;
- Microsoft Windows XP (toutes les versions) ;
- Microsoft Windows Server 2003 (toutes les versions).
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003eMicrosoft .NET Framework version 2.0 pour les syst\u00e8mes d\u0027exploitation suivants :\u003c/P\u003e \u003cUL\u003e \u003cLI\u003eMicrosoft Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eMicrosoft Windows XP (toutes les versions) ;\u003c/LI\u003e \u003cLI\u003eMicrosoft Windows Server 2003 (toutes les versions).\u003c/LI\u003e \u003c/UL\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de type injection de code indirecte (cross-site\nscripting) a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans le composant .NET version 2.0 de\nMicrosoft Windows. Ce composant a pour objectif d\u0027aider \u00e0 concevoir des\napplications Windows, en g\u00e9rant certains aspects au cours de son\nex\u00e9cution (allocation de la m\u00e9moire, gestion des droits, etc).\n\nCette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 permettrait \u00e0 une personne malveillante de\ncontourner la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et d\u0027acc\u00e9der \u00e0 des informations sans\nautorisation pr\u00e9alable. Il lui faut pour cela inciter l\u0027utilisateur \u00e0\nvisiter une page Web sp\u00e9cialement construite : quand le script sera\nex\u00e9cut\u00e9 par le navigateur de ce dernier, de l\u0027information pourrait lui\n\u00eatre d\u00e9rob\u00e9e.\n\nCette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de fonctionne que si le param\u00e8tre de contr\u00f4le\nAutoPostBack de .NET Framework 2.0 a pour valeur True. Ce n\u0027est pas le\ncas par d\u00e9faut.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 MS06-056 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur Microsoft pour\nl\u0027obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2006-3436",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-3436"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2006-10-11T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2006-10-11T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Article 328923 de la Base de connaissances Microsoft concernant les param\u00e8tres de contr\u00f4le de .NET Framework 2.0 :",
"url": "http://support.microsoft.com/?id=328923"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2006-AVI-436",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2006-10-11T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
},
{
"description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
}
],
"summary": null,
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Microsoft ASP.NET Framework",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Microsoft MS06-056 du 10 octobre 2006",
"url": "http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS06-056.mspx"
}
]
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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