CERTA-2006-AVI-288
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2006-07-12 - Updated: 2006-07-12None
Description
Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans Adobe Acrobat. Le logiciel ne vérifie pas correctement certains contenus au cours de la conversion d'un document au format PDF. Un utilisateur malveillant peut exploiter cette vulnérabilité en construisant un fichier particulier. Ce dernier lui permettrait d'exécuter du code arbitraire à distance dans le cas où le fichier est ensuite converti par une personne au format PDF sur un système vulnérable.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
La version d'Adobe Acrobat 6.0.4 ainsi que celles antérieures.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003eLa version d\u0027Adobe Acrobat 6.0.4 ainsi que celles ant\u00e9rieures.\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans Adobe Acrobat. Le logiciel ne\nv\u00e9rifie pas correctement certains contenus au cours de la conversion\nd\u0027un document au format PDF. Un utilisateur malveillant peut exploiter\ncette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 en construisant un fichier particulier. Ce dernier\nlui permettrait d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire \u00e0 distance dans le cas o\u00f9\nle fichier est ensuite converti par une personne au format PDF sur un\nsyst\u00e8me vuln\u00e9rable.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2006-3453",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-3453"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2006-07-12T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2006-07-12T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Mises \u00e0 jour d\u0027Adobe Acrobat :",
"url": "http://www.adobe.com/support/downloads"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Adobe Systems Inc. APSB06-09 du 11 juillet 2006 :",
"url": "http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb06-09.html"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2006-AVI-288",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2006-07-12T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": null,
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 d\u0027Adobe Acrobat",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Adobe du 11 juillet 2006",
"url": null
}
]
}
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Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
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