CERTA-2006-AVI-287
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2006-07-12 - Updated: 2006-07-12
Description
Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans le client DHCP de Microsoft Windows. DHCP (pour Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) est une norme IP conçue pour réduire la complexité de gestion de la configuration des adresses réseaux. DHCP y parvient en utilisant un serveur pour la gestion centralisée des adresses IP et de certains autres détails de configuration utilisés sur le réseau. Les relations client-serveur sont décrites dans le RFC 2131 de l'IETF.
Le client DHCP de Microsoft Windows ne contrôlerait pas correctement un espace mémoire. Un utilisateur malveillant distant peut profiter de cette vulnérabilité pour envoyer un paquet DHCP mal formé au système affecté, et y exécuter du code arbitraire.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Les systèmes d'exploitation Microsoft Windows 98, Microsoft Windows 98 Deuxième Édition (SE) et Microsoft Windows Millennium Edition (ME) ne sont pas concernés.
| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft | Windows | Microsoft Windows Server 2003 et Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 ; | ||
| Microsoft | Windows | Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 1 et Service Pack 2 ; | ||
| Microsoft | Windows | Microsoft Windows Server 2003 pour les systèmes Itanium ou Édition x64 ; | ||
| Microsoft | Windows | Microsoft Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 ; |
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Microsoft Windows Server 2003 et Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 ;",
"product": {
"name": "Windows",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 1 et Service Pack 2 ;",
"product": {
"name": "Windows",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Windows Server 2003 pour les syst\u00e8mes Itanium ou \u00c9dition x64 ;",
"product": {
"name": "Windows",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 ;",
"product": {
"name": "Windows",
"vendor": {
"name": "Microsoft",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003eLes syst\u00e8mes d\u0027exploitation Microsoft Windows 98, Microsoft Windows 98 Deuxi\u00e8me \u00c9dition (SE) et Microsoft Windows Millennium Edition (ME) ne sont pas concern\u00e9s.\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Description\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans le client DHCP de Microsoft Windows. DHCP (pour Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) est une norme IP con\u00e7ue pour r\u00e9duire la complexit\u00e9 de gestion de la configuration des adresses r\u00e9seaux. DHCP y parvient en utilisant un serveur pour la gestion centralis\u00e9e des adresses IP et de certains autres d\u00e9tails de configuration utilis\u00e9s sur le r\u00e9seau. Les relations client-serveur sont d\u00e9crites dans le RFC 2131 de l\u0027IETF.\n\nLe client DHCP de Microsoft Windows ne contr\u00f4lerait pas correctement un espace m\u00e9moire. Un utilisateur malveillant distant peut profiter de cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 pour envoyer un paquet DHCP mal form\u00e9 au syst\u00e8me affect\u00e9, et y ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2006-2372",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-2372"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2006-07-12T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2006-07-12T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans le client DHCP de Microsoft Windows. DHCP (pour Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) est une norme IP con\u00e7ue pour r\u00e9duire la complexit\u00e9 de gestion de la configuration des adresses r\u00e9seaux. DHCP y parvient en utilisant un serveur pour la gestion centralis\u00e9e des adresses IP et de certains autres d\u00e9tails de configuration utilis\u00e9s sur le r\u00e9seau. Les relations client-serveur sont d\u00e9crites dans le RFC 2131 de l\u0027IETF.",
"url": "http://www.microsoft.com/france/technet/security/Bulletin/MS06-036.mspx"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2006-AVI-287",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2006-07-12T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": "",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 du client DHCP de Microsoft Windows",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": "2006-07-11",
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de Microsoft ",
"url": "http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS06-036.mspx"
}
]
}
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