CERTA-2006-AVI-175
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2006-04-28 - Updated: 2006-04-28None
Description
La bibliothèque xine-lib fournit un ensemble de fonctions permettant de construire un lecteur multimedia. Parmi les produits pouvant employer cette bibliothèque on trouve xine, gxine, les composants du bureau KDE kdemultimedia... Une vulnérabilité dans la gestion par xine-lib des fichiers de type MPEG permet à un utilisateur mal intentionné de réaliser un débordement de mémoire et ainsi d'exécuter du code arbitraire sur la machine vulnérable.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Tout système avec un lecteur multimedia utilisant la bibliothèque xine-lib en version 1.1.1 ou toute version antérieure.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cp\u003eTout syst\u00e8me avec un lecteur multimedia utilisant la biblioth\u00e8que \u003cTT\u003exine-lib\u003c/TT\u003e en version 1.1.1 ou toute version ant\u00e9rieure.\u003c/p\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nLa biblioth\u00e8que xine-lib fournit un ensemble de fonctions permettant de\nconstruire un lecteur multimedia. Parmi les produits pouvant employer\ncette biblioth\u00e8que on trouve xine, gxine, les composants du bureau KDE\nkdemultimedia... Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans la gestion par xine-lib des\nfichiers de type MPEG permet \u00e0 un utilisateur mal intentionn\u00e9 de\nr\u00e9aliser un d\u00e9bordement de m\u00e9moire et ainsi d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code\narbitraire sur la machine vuln\u00e9rable.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2006-1664",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-1664"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2006-04-28T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2006-04-28T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Site Internet de xine :",
"url": "http://xinehq.de"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Gentoo GLSA-200604-16 du 26 avril 2006 :",
"url": "http://www.gentoo.org/security/en/glsa/glsa-200604-16.xml"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2006-AVI-175",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2006-04-28T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": null,
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de la biblioth\u00e8que multimedia xine-lib",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Gentoo GLSA 200604-16 du 26 avril 2006",
"url": null
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.