CERTA-2006-AVI-104
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2006-03-13 - Updated: 2006-04-18None
Description
Une ancienne vulnérabilité de Xpdf (cf. CERTA-2005-AVI-483) n'a pas été pas corrigés dans certaines versions de Kpdf. Ces versions sont donc toujours vulnérables.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat | Red Hat Enterprise Linux | Red Hat Enterprise Linux AS (v.4) ; | ||
| N/A | N/A | Mandriva CS3.0 ; | ||
| Red Hat | Red Hat Enterprise Linux | Red Hat Enterprise Linux ES (v.4) ; | ||
| Red Hat | Red Hat Enterprise Linux | Red Hat Enterprise Linux WS (v.4) ; | ||
| Red Hat | N/A | Red Hat Desktop (v.4) ; | ||
| N/A | N/A | Mandriva 2006.0. |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
|||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux AS (v.4) ;",
"product": {
"name": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Red Hat",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Mandriva CS3.0 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux ES (v.4) ;",
"product": {
"name": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Red Hat",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux WS (v.4) ;",
"product": {
"name": "Red Hat Enterprise Linux",
"vendor": {
"name": "Red Hat",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Red Hat Desktop (v.4) ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Red Hat",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Mandriva 2006.0.",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nUne ancienne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de Xpdf (cf. CERTA-2005-AVI-483) n\u0027a pas \u00e9t\u00e9\npas corrig\u00e9s dans certaines versions de Kpdf. Ces versions sont donc\ntoujours vuln\u00e9rables.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2006-1244",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-1244"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2006-0746",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-0746"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2006-03-13T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2006-04-18T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Ubuntu USn-270 du 13 avril 2006 :",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-270-1"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Debian DSA-1008 du 17 mars 2006 :",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2006/dsa-1008"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 RedHat RHSA-2006:0262 du 09 mars 2006 :",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2006-0262.html"
},
{
"title": "Avis du CERTA num\u00e9ro CERTA-2005-AVI-483 :",
"url": "http://www.certa.ssi.gouv.fr/site/CERTA-2005-AVI-483/CERTA-2005-AVI-483.html"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Mandriva MDKSA-2006:054 du 08 mars 2006 :",
"url": "http://wwwnew.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDKSA-2006:054"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Debian DSA-1019 du 24 mars 2006 :",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2006/dsa-1019"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2006-AVI-104",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2006-03-13T00:00:00.000000"
},
{
"description": "ajout de la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Debian.",
"revision_date": "2006-03-20T00:00:00.000000"
},
{
"description": "ajout de la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Debian DSA-1019.",
"revision_date": "2006-03-24T00:00:00.000000"
},
{
"description": "ajout de la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Ubuntu USN-270.",
"revision_date": "2006-04-18T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire"
}
],
"summary": null,
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de Kpdf",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de mise \u00e0 jour Mandriva MDKSA-2006:054",
"url": null
},
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de mise \u00e0 jour REDHAT RHSA-2006:0262",
"url": null
}
]
}
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