BREW-RAWDOG-CVE-2026-59823 (GHSA-HX8V-G79F-8W5F)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-09-18 17:55 – Updated: 2026-10-14 14:57 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
LiteLLM Proxy has server-side request forgery via the `user_config` request parameter
Details

Summary

A server-side request forgery in LiteLLM Proxy lets an authenticated caller redirect the proxy's outbound request to a host of their choosing by smuggling an api_base inside the user_config request body, bypassing the existing parameter guard.

Details

LiteLLM Proxy validates request bodies with is_request_body_safe, which blocks the api_base and base_url parameters but does not cover user_config. The user_config object is used to build the outbound router for a request, so a caller can place an api_base inside it and reach an arbitrary host. The guard only inspected the two top-level keys, so the same api_base nested inside user_config was never checked.

Exploitation requires a valid virtual key.

Impact

An authenticated caller can make the proxy issue server-side requests to internal or external hosts of their choosing, reaching endpoints the caller cannot otherwise access.

Affected / Patched

Affected: <= 1.83.8 Patched: 1.83.9

Remediation

Upgrade to 1.83.9 or later (released 2026-04-17).

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": null,
        "range_state": "affected",
        "resource": "litellm",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/litellm@1.83.7",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "1.83.9"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "rawdog",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/rawdog"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.1.5"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.6_24"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "0.1.6_27"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/litellm@1.83.7",
        "name": "litellm",
        "resource": "litellm",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "1.83.7"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA server-side request forgery in LiteLLM Proxy lets an authenticated caller redirect the\nproxy\u0027s outbound request to a host of their choosing by smuggling an `api_base` inside the\n`user_config` request body, bypassing the existing parameter guard.\n\n### Details\nLiteLLM Proxy validates request bodies with `is_request_body_safe`, which blocks the\n`api_base` and `base_url` parameters but does not cover `user_config`. The `user_config`\nobject is used to build the outbound router for a request, so a caller can place an\n`api_base` inside it and reach an arbitrary host. The guard only inspected the two\ntop-level keys, so the same `api_base` nested inside `user_config` was never checked.\n\nExploitation requires a valid virtual key.\n\n### Impact\nAn authenticated caller can make the proxy issue server-side requests to internal or\nexternal hosts of their choosing, reaching endpoints the caller cannot otherwise access.\n\n### Affected / Patched\nAffected: `\u003c= 1.83.8`\nPatched: `1.83.9`\n\n### Remediation\nUpgrade to 1.83.9 or later (released 2026-04-17).",
  "id": "BREW-rawdog-CVE-2026-59823",
  "modified": "2026-10-14T14:57:20Z",
  "published": "2026-09-18T17:55:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/security/advisories/GHSA-hx8v-g79f-8w5f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59823"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/25827"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/commit/47214be317f45a2d2ac08258362e0481411eb427"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LiteLLM Proxy has server-side request forgery via the `user_config` request parameter",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-hx8v-g79f-8w5f",
    "CVE-2026-59823",
    "PYSEC-2026-4070"
  ]
}



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