BREW-RAWDOG-CVE-2026-42271 (GHSA-V4P8-MG3P-G94G)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:32 – Updated: 2026-10-15 09:04 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
LiteLLM: Authenticated command execution via MCP stdio test endpoints
Details

Impact

Two endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it — POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list — accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the command, args, and env fields used by the stdio transport. When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host with the privileges of the proxy process.

The endpoints were gated only by a valid proxy API key, with no role check. Any authenticated user — including holders of low-privilege internal-user keys — could therefore run arbitrary commands on the host.

Patches

Fixed in 1.83.7. Both test endpoints now require the PROXY_ADMIN role, bringing them into line with the save endpoint.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, developers should block POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list at their reverse proxy or API gateway.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "resource": "litellm",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/litellm@1.83.7",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "1.83.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "rawdog",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/rawdog"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.1.6_15"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.6_22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/litellm@1.83.7",
        "name": "litellm",
        "resource": "litellm",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "1.83.7"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nTwo endpoints used to preview an MCP server before saving it \u2014 `POST /mcp-rest/test/connection` and `POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list` \u2014 accepted a full server configuration in the request body, including the `command`, `args`, and `env` fields used by the stdio transport. When called with a stdio configuration, the endpoints attempted to connect, which spawned the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host with the privileges of the proxy process.\n\nThe endpoints were gated only by a valid proxy API key, with no role check. Any authenticated user \u2014 including holders of low-privilege internal-user keys \u2014 could therefore run arbitrary commands on the host.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **`1.83.7`**. Both test endpoints now require the `PROXY_ADMIN` role, bringing them into line with the save endpoint.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, developers should block `POST /mcp-rest/test/connection` and `POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list` at their reverse proxy or API gateway.",
  "id": "BREW-rawdog-CVE-2026-42271",
  "modified": "2026-10-15T09:04:00Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:32:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/security/advisories/GHSA-v4p8-mg3p-g94g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42271"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-42271"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LiteLLM: Authenticated command execution via MCP stdio test endpoints",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-v4p8-mg3p-g94g",
    "CVE-2026-42271",
    "PYSEC-2026-2599"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.