BREW-PNPM@10-CVE-2026-48995 (GHSA-HG3W-7F8C-63HP)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:28 – Updated: 2026-10-26 09:17 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
pnpm: Tarball hash of GitHub git dependencies is not stored in lockfile
Details

Summary

A malicious codeload.github.com server can serve whatever tarball it wants and pnpm will install it regardless of the lockfile.

Details

The lockfile does not store the hash of the dependencies from https://codeload.github.com

This means that if this server was compromised or a person's machine configuration was compromised, pnpm would download and install these dependencies.

PoC

> pnpm -v     
10.28.2

Given the following package.json:

{
  "dependencies": {
    "add": "git://github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep.git#b3eeb9b"
  }
}

This produces a lockfile like so:

lockfileVersion: '9.0'

settings:
  autoInstallPeers: true
  excludeLinksFromLockfile: false

importers:

  .:
    dependencies:
      add:
        specifier: git://github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep.git#b3eeb9b
        version: https://codeload.github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep/tar.gz/b3eeb9b

packages:

  add@https://codeload.github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep/tar.gz/b3eeb9b:
    resolution: {tarball: https://codeload.github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep/tar.gz/b3eeb9b}
    version: 1.0.0

snapshots:

  add@https://codeload.github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep/tar.gz/b3eeb9b: {}

Notice that there is no hash. The b3eeb9b is not sufficient because I can configure my machine to resolve a compromised tarball from that url (I tested it out and pnpm just installs it).

Impact

Anyone relying on github git dependencies.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "10.33.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "pnpm@10",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/pnpm%4010"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.33.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.33.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/pnpm@10.34.9",
        "name": "pnpm",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "10.34.9"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA malicious `codeload.github.com` server can serve whatever tarball it wants and pnpm will install it regardless of the lockfile.\n\n### Details\n\nThe lockfile does not store the hash of the dependencies from https://codeload.github.com\n\nThis means that if this server was compromised or a person\u0027s machine configuration was compromised, pnpm would download and install these dependencies.\n\n### PoC\n\n```sh\n\u003e pnpm -v     \n10.28.2\n```\n\nGiven the following package.json:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"dependencies\": {\n    \"add\": \"git://github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep.git#b3eeb9b\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThis produces a lockfile like so:\n\n```yaml\nlockfileVersion: \u00279.0\u0027\n\nsettings:\n  autoInstallPeers: true\n  excludeLinksFromLockfile: false\n\nimporters:\n\n  .:\n    dependencies:\n      add:\n        specifier: git://github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep.git#b3eeb9b\n        version: https://codeload.github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep/tar.gz/b3eeb9b\n\npackages:\n\n  add@https://codeload.github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep/tar.gz/b3eeb9b:\n    resolution: {tarball: https://codeload.github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep/tar.gz/b3eeb9b}\n    version: 1.0.0\n\nsnapshots:\n\n  add@https://codeload.github.com/dsherret/npm-git-dep/tar.gz/b3eeb9b: {}\n```\n\nNotice that there is no hash. The `b3eeb9b` is not sufficient because I can configure my machine to resolve a compromised tarball from that url (I tested it out and pnpm just installs it).\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone relying on github git dependencies.",
  "id": "BREW-pnpm@10-CVE-2026-48995",
  "modified": "2026-10-26T09:17:29Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:28:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-hg3w-7f8c-63hp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48995"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pnpm: Tarball hash of GitHub git dependencies is not stored in lockfile",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-hg3w-7f8c-63hp",
    "CVE-2026-48995"
  ]
}



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