BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-CHR9-M4Q2-76HW)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-09-25 08:57 – Source websiteSummary
In affected LAN/shared-token Control UI deployments, a caller could spoof locality information used during Control UI pairing and obtain a durable admin-capable device token.
This issue is limited to deployments where the caller already has the network/authentication foothold needed to reach the Control UI pairing path. It is not an unauthenticated internet exposure issue.
Affected configurations
This affects configurations such as LAN-bound gateways or shared-token Control UI access where locality signals were accepted as sufficient for pairing decisions.
Impact
A temporary or shared Control UI access path could be turned into a persistent admin device token. That token could remain useful after the shared gateway token was rotated, unless the paired device was removed.
The issue is a pairing/locality validation problem: locality-derived trust was stronger than it should have been.
Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is 2026.5.22.
Mitigations
Upgrade to openclaw@2026.5.22 or later. For older deployments, remove unexpected paired devices and avoid exposing Control UI pairing paths on networks with untrusted clients.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.5.22"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.29"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.5.28"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.9.6",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.9.6"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nIn affected LAN/shared-token Control UI deployments, a caller could spoof locality information used during Control UI pairing and obtain a durable admin-capable device token.\n\nThis issue is limited to deployments where the caller already has the network/authentication foothold needed to reach the Control UI pairing path. It is not an unauthenticated internet exposure issue.\n\n### Affected configurations\n\nThis affects configurations such as LAN-bound gateways or shared-token Control UI access where locality signals were accepted as sufficient for pairing decisions.\n\n### Impact\n\nA temporary or shared Control UI access path could be turned into a persistent admin device token. That token could remain useful after the shared gateway token was rotated, unless the paired device was removed.\n\nThe issue is a pairing/locality validation problem: locality-derived trust was stronger than it should have been.\n\n### Patched Versions\n\nThe first stable patched version is `2026.5.22`.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nUpgrade to `openclaw@2026.5.22` or later. For older deployments, remove unexpected paired devices and avoid exposing Control UI pairing paths on networks with untrusted clients.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-53817",
"modified": "2026-09-25T08:57:16Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-chr9-m4q2-76hw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53817"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-control-ui-locality-spoofing-in-device-pairing"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Control UI locality spoofing could mint a durable admin device token",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-chr9-m4q2-76hw",
"CVE-2026-53817"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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