BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-2XCP-X87W-Q377)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-11-21 09:09 – Source websiteAffected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
< 2026.4.20 - Patched version:
2026.4.20
Impact
Templated hook mapping sessionKey values were treated differently from request-supplied session keys. A hook mapping could render an externally influenced session key even when hooks.allowRequestSessionKey was disabled, bypassing the intended routing opt-in for hook callers.
This affects webhook routing isolation. It does not grant host execution by itself. Severity is medium.
Fix
Template-rendered mapping session keys are now treated as externally supplied routing input and require hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true plus the existing prefix policy checks.
Fix commit:
5275d008ed33203dba3f98e969ad683a65c416c3
Release
Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.4.20.
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Homebrew |
openclaw-cli
pkg:brew/openclaw-cli
|
Affected: ≥ 2026.1.29, < 2026.4.20 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.4.20"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.29"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.11.6",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.11.6"
}
]
},
"details": "## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c 2026.4.20`\n- Patched version: `2026.4.20`\n\n## Impact\n\nTemplated hook mapping `sessionKey` values were treated differently from request-supplied session keys. A hook mapping could render an externally influenced session key even when `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey` was disabled, bypassing the intended routing opt-in for hook callers.\n\nThis affects webhook routing isolation. It does not grant host execution by itself. Severity is medium.\n\n## Fix\n\nTemplate-rendered mapping session keys are now treated as externally supplied routing input and require `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true` plus the existing prefix policy checks.\n\nFix commit:\n\n- `5275d008ed33203dba3f98e969ad683a65c416c3`\n\n## Release\n\nFixed in OpenClaw `2026.4.20`.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-45002",
"modified": "2026-11-21T09:09:27Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-2xcp-x87w-q377"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5275d008ed33203dba3f98e969ad683a65c416c3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-hook-session-key-bypass-via-template-mapping"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Hook mapping templates could bypass hook session-key opt-in",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-2xcp-x87w-q377",
"CVE-2026-45002"
]
}
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