BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-WPPJ-C6MR-83JJ)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-11-10 09:00 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: OpenShell FS bridge writes stay pinned to the sandbox mount root
Details

Summary

OpenShell FS bridge writes stay pinned to the sandbox mount root

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.4.21
  • Fixed version: 2026.4.22

Impact

A time-of-check/time-of-use race around OpenShell sandbox filesystem writes could let a symlink swap redirect a write outside the intended local mount root.

Fix

OpenShell write paths now validate the canonical target against the mount root, reject unsafe symlink parents and symlink leaves for writes, and use root-scoped write helpers before syncing to the remote sandbox.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 7be82d4fd1193bcb7e44ee38838f00bf924ffa76

Verification

  • The fix commit is contained in the public v2026.4.22 tag.
  • openclaw@2026.4.22 is published on npm and the compiled package contains the fix.
  • Focused regression coverage for this path passed before publication.

Thanks @VladimirEliTokarev for reporting.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
6.0 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.4.22"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.29"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.4.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.11.2",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.11.2"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nOpenShell FS bridge writes stay pinned to the sandbox mount root \n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: openclaw (npm)\n- Affected versions: \u003c= 2026.4.21\n- Fixed version: 2026.4.22\n\n## Impact\nA time-of-check/time-of-use race around OpenShell sandbox filesystem writes could let a symlink swap redirect a write outside the intended local mount root.\n\n## Fix\nOpenShell write paths now validate the canonical target against the mount root, reject unsafe symlink parents and symlink leaves for writes, and use root-scoped write helpers before syncing to the remote sandbox.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- 7be82d4fd1193bcb7e44ee38838f00bf924ffa76\n\n## Verification\n- The fix commit is contained in the public v2026.4.22 tag.\n- openclaw@2026.4.22 is published on npm and the compiled package contains the fix.\n- Focused regression coverage for this path passed before publication.\n\nThanks @VladimirEliTokarev for reporting.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-44112",
  "modified": "2026-11-10T09:00:02Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-wppj-c6mr-83jj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44112"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/7be82d4fd1193bcb7e44ee38838f00bf924ffa76"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-symlink-swap-race-condition-in-openshell-fs-bridge-writes"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: OpenShell FS bridge writes stay pinned to the sandbox mount root",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-wppj-c6mr-83jj",
    "CVE-2026-44112"
  ]
}



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