BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-VFP4-8X56-J7C5)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-11-10 09:00 – Source websiteSummary
Exec environment denylist missed high-risk interpreter startup variables.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw - Ecosystem: npm
- Affected versions:
< 2026.4.10 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.4.10
Impact
The exec environment policy missed interpreter startup variables such as VIMINIT, EXINIT, LUA_INIT, and HOSTALIASES, allowing operator-supplied environment overrides to influence downstream execution or network behavior.
Technical Details
The fix expands the host environment security policy denylist to cover these and related high-risk environment variables, with regression coverage.
Fix
The issue was fixed in #63277. The first stable tag containing the fix is v2026.4.10, and openclaw@2026.4.14 includes the fix.
Fix Commit(s)
2d126fc62343a7b6895351f96e4e1474bc358140- PR: #63277
Release Process Note
Users should upgrade to openclaw 2026.4.10 or newer. The latest npm release, 2026.4.14, already includes the fix.
Credits
Thanks to @feiyang666 of Tencent zhuque Lab (https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard) for reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.4.10"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.29"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.11.2",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.11.2"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nExec environment denylist missed high-risk interpreter startup variables.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw`\n- Ecosystem: npm\n- Affected versions: `\u003c 2026.4.10`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.4.10`\n\n## Impact\n\nThe exec environment policy missed interpreter startup variables such as `VIMINIT`, `EXINIT`, `LUA_INIT`, and `HOSTALIASES`, allowing operator-supplied environment overrides to influence downstream execution or network behavior.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe fix expands the host environment security policy denylist to cover these and related high-risk environment variables, with regression coverage.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe issue was fixed in #63277. The first stable tag containing the fix is `v2026.4.10`, and `openclaw@2026.4.14` includes the fix.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `2d126fc62343a7b6895351f96e4e1474bc358140`\n- PR: #63277\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nUsers should upgrade to `openclaw` 2026.4.10 or newer. The latest npm release, `2026.4.14`, already includes the fix.\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks to @feiyang666 of Tencent zhuque Lab (https://github.com/Tencent/AI-Infra-Guard) for reporting this issue.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-43584",
"modified": "2026-11-10T09:00:02Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-vfp4-8x56-j7c5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43584"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/2d126fc62343a7b6895351f96e4e1474bc358140"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-insufficient-environment-variable-denylist-in-exec-policy"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Exec environment denylist missed high-risk interpreter startup variables",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-vfp4-8x56-j7c5",
"CVE-2026-43584"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.