BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-JHPV-5J76-M56H)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-11-10 09:00 – Source websiteSummary
OpenClaw's outbound host-media attachment read helper could enable host-local file reads based on global or agent-level read access without also honoring sender and group-scoped tool policy. In channel deployments that used toolsBySender or group policy to deny read for less-trusted senders, a denied sender could still trigger host-media attachment loading and cause readable local files to be returned through the outbound media path.
Affected Versions
This issue is known to affect OpenClaw 2026.4.9. Earlier versions were not confirmed during triage, so the advisory range is intentionally scoped to >= 2026.4.9 < 2026.4.10.
Impact
Affected deployments are those that both allow host read or filesystem root expansion at the global/agent level and rely on sender or group-scoped policy to deny read for some channel participants. In that configuration, the intended sender/group authorization boundary could be bypassed for outbound media reads, potentially disclosing host-local files readable by the OpenClaw process.
The issue does not require treating the model prompt as the security boundary. The vulnerable behavior was a concrete policy enforcement mismatch: sender/group policy denied read, while the host-media read helper could still be installed without that sender context.
Resolution
Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.4.10 by PR #64459, commit c949af9fabf3873b5b7c484090cb5f5ab6049a98. The fix threads sender, session, channel, and account context into outbound media access resolution and intersects host-media read capability creation with the existing group tool policy for read. When a concrete sender/group override denies read, OpenClaw no longer creates the host readFile media capability.
Additional attachment canonicalization hardening shipped in 2026.4.14, but the authorization bypass described here was fixed in 2026.4.10.
Credit
Thanks to @Telecaster2147 for reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.4.10"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.4.9"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.11.2",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.11.2"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOpenClaw\u0027s outbound host-media attachment read helper could enable host-local file reads based on global or agent-level read access without also honoring sender and group-scoped tool policy. In channel deployments that used `toolsBySender` or group policy to deny `read` for less-trusted senders, a denied sender could still trigger host-media attachment loading and cause readable local files to be returned through the outbound media path.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nThis issue is known to affect OpenClaw 2026.4.9. Earlier versions were not confirmed during triage, so the advisory range is intentionally scoped to `\u003e= 2026.4.9 \u003c 2026.4.10`.\n\n## Impact\n\nAffected deployments are those that both allow host read or filesystem root expansion at the global/agent level and rely on sender or group-scoped policy to deny `read` for some channel participants. In that configuration, the intended sender/group authorization boundary could be bypassed for outbound media reads, potentially disclosing host-local files readable by the OpenClaw process.\n\nThe issue does not require treating the model prompt as the security boundary. The vulnerable behavior was a concrete policy enforcement mismatch: sender/group policy denied `read`, while the host-media read helper could still be installed without that sender context.\n\n## Resolution\n\nFixed in OpenClaw 2026.4.10 by PR #64459, commit `c949af9fabf3873b5b7c484090cb5f5ab6049a98`. The fix threads sender, session, channel, and account context into outbound media access resolution and intersects host-media read capability creation with the existing group tool policy for `read`. When a concrete sender/group override denies `read`, OpenClaw no longer creates the host `readFile` media capability.\n\nAdditional attachment canonicalization hardening shipped in 2026.4.14, but the authorization bypass described here was fixed in 2026.4.10.\n\n## Credit\n\nThanks to @Telecaster2147 for reporting this issue.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-42438",
"modified": "2026-11-10T09:00:02Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-jhpv-5j76-m56h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/64459"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c949af9fabf3873b5b7c484090cb5f5ab6049a98"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Sender policy bypass in host media attachment reads allows unauthorized local file disclosure",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-jhpv-5j76-m56h",
"CVE-2026-42438"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.