BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-WQ58-2PVG-5H4F)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-11-17 09:11 – Source websiteSummary
Before v2026.3.23, the Gateway agent RPC accepted /reset and /new for callers with only operator.write, even though the direct sessions.reset RPC correctly requires operator.admin.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected:
< 2026.3.23 - Fixed:
>= 2026.3.23 - Latest released tag checked:
v2026.3.23-2(630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87) - Latest published npm version checked:
2026.3.23-2
Root Cause
The vulnerable path lived in src/gateway/server-methods/agent.ts. A /reset or /new message with an explicit sessionKey reached performGatewaySessionReset(...) without enforcing the same operator.admin guard used by sessions.reset.
Fix Commit(s)
50f6a2f136fed85b58548a38f7a3dbb98d2cd1a0—fix(gateway): require admin for agent session reset
Release Status
The fix commit is contained in released tags v2026.3.23 and v2026.3.23-2. The latest shipped tag and npm release both include the fix.
Code-Level Confirmation
src/gateway/server-methods/agent.tsnow rejects/resetand/newfor callers that do not haveoperator.adminbefore callingperformGatewaySessionReset(...).src/gateway/server-methods/agent.test.tscontains the regression testrejects /reset for write-scoped gateway callers.
Thanks @smaeljaish771 for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.3.23"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.29"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.11.4",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.11.4"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\nBefore `v2026.3.23`, the Gateway `agent` RPC accepted `/reset` and `/new` for callers with only `operator.write`, even though the direct `sessions.reset` RPC correctly requires `operator.admin`.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c 2026.3.23`\n- Fixed: `\u003e= 2026.3.23`\n- Latest released tag checked: `v2026.3.23-2` (`630f1479c44f78484dfa21bb407cbe6f171dac87`)\n- Latest published npm version checked: `2026.3.23-2`\n\n## Root Cause\nThe vulnerable path lived in `src/gateway/server-methods/agent.ts`. A `/reset` or `/new` message with an explicit `sessionKey` reached `performGatewaySessionReset(...)` without enforcing the same `operator.admin` guard used by `sessions.reset`.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `50f6a2f136fed85b58548a38f7a3dbb98d2cd1a0` \u2014 `fix(gateway): require admin for agent session reset`\n\n## Release Status\nThe fix commit is contained in released tags `v2026.3.23` and `v2026.3.23-2`. The latest shipped tag and npm release both include the fix.\n\n## Code-Level Confirmation\n- `src/gateway/server-methods/agent.ts` now rejects `/reset` and `/new` for callers that do not have `operator.admin` before calling `performGatewaySessionReset(...)`.\n- `src/gateway/server-methods/agent.test.ts` contains the regression test `rejects /reset for write-scoped gateway callers`.\n\nThanks @smaeljaish771 for reporting.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-35660",
"modified": "2026-11-17T09:11:56Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-wq58-2pvg-5h4f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/50f6a2f136fed85b58548a38f7a3dbb98d2cd1a0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Gateway agent /reset exposes admin session reset to operator.write callers",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-wq58-2pvg-5h4f",
"CVE-2026-35660"
]
}
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