BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-XVHF-X56F-2HPP)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-11-13 09:11 – Source websiteSummary
OpenClaw's exec-approvals allowlist supports a small set of "safe bins" intended to be stdin-only (no positional file arguments) when running tools.exec.host=gateway|node with security=allowlist.
In affected configurations, the allowlist validation checked pre-expansion argv tokens, but execution used a real shell (sh -c) which expands globs and environment variables. This allowed safe bins like head, tail, or grep to read arbitrary local files via tokens such as * or $HOME/... without triggering approvals.
This issue is configuration-dependent and is not exercised by default settings (default tools.exec.host is sandbox).
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected:
<= 2026.2.13 - Patched:
>= 2026.2.14(planned; publish the advisory after the npm release is out)
Impact
An authorized but untrusted caller (or prompt-injection) could cause the gateway/node process to disclose files readable by that process when host execution is enabled in allowlist mode.
Fix
Safe-bins executions now force argv tokens to be treated as literal text at execution time (single-quoted), preventing globbing and $VARS expansion from turning "safe" tokens into file paths.
Fix Commit(s)
- 77b89719d5b7e271f48b6f49e334a8b991468c3b
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set for the next planned release (>= 2026.2.14) so publishing is a single click once that npm version is available.
Thanks @christos-eth for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.14"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "openclaw-cli",
"purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2026.1.29"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.11.3",
"name": "openclaw",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2026.11.3"
}
]
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOpenClaw\u0027s exec-approvals allowlist supports a small set of \"safe bins\" intended to be stdin-only (no positional file arguments) when running `tools.exec.host=gateway|node` with `security=allowlist`.\n\nIn affected configurations, the allowlist validation checked pre-expansion argv tokens, but execution used a real shell (`sh -c`) which expands globs and environment variables. This allowed safe bins like `head`, `tail`, or `grep` to read arbitrary local files via tokens such as `*` or `$HOME/...` without triggering approvals.\n\nThis issue is configuration-dependent and is not exercised by default settings (default `tools.exec.host` is `sandbox`).\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.13`\n- Patched: `\u003e= 2026.2.14` (planned; publish the advisory after the npm release is out)\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authorized but untrusted caller (or prompt-injection) could cause the gateway/node process to disclose files readable by that process when host execution is enabled in allowlist mode.\n\n## Fix\n\nSafe-bins executions now force argv tokens to be treated as literal text at execution time (single-quoted), preventing globbing and `$VARS` expansion from turning \"safe\" tokens into file paths.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- 77b89719d5b7e271f48b6f49e334a8b991468c3b\n\n## Release Process Note\n\n`patched_versions` is pre-set for the next planned release (`\u003e= 2026.2.14`) so publishing is a single click once that npm version is available.\n\nThanks @christos-eth for reporting.",
"id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-28463",
"modified": "2026-11-13T09:11:44Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-xvhf-x56f-2hpp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28463"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/77b89719d5b7e271f48b6f49e334a8b991468c3b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-file-read-via-shell-expansion-in-safe-bins-allowlist"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw exec approvals: safeBins could bypass stdin-only constraints via shell expansion",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-xvhf-x56f-2hpp",
"CVE-2026-28463"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.