BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-9Q36-67VC-RRWG)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-11-21 09:13 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Sandboxed /acp spawn requests could initialize host ACP sessions
Details

Summary

Sandboxed requester sessions could reach host-side ACP session initialization through /acp spawn.

OpenClaw already blocked sessions_spawn({ runtime: "acp" }) from sandboxed sessions, but the slash-command path initialized ACP directly without applying the same host-runtime guard first.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • npm package: openclaw
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.3.2
  • Patched version: >= 2026.3.7

Details

ACP sessions run on the host, not inside the OpenClaw sandbox. The direct ACP spawn path in src/agents/acp-spawn.ts already denied sandboxed requesters, but /acp spawn in src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts called initializeSession(...) without first applying the same restriction.

In affected versions, an already authorized sender in a sandboxed session could use /acp spawn to cross from sandboxed chat context into host-side ACP runtime initialization when ACP was enabled and a backend was available.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 61000b8e4ded919ca1a825d4700db4cb3fdc56e3

Fix Details

The fix introduced a shared ACP runtime-policy guard in src/agents/acp-spawn.ts and reused it from the /acp spawn handler in src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts before any ACP backend initialization. Regression coverage was added in src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp.test.ts to prove sandboxed /acp spawn requests are rejected early, while existing ACP spawn behavior for non-sandboxed sessions remains unchanged.

Release Process Note

Patched version is pre-set to 2026.3.7 so the advisory can be published once that npm release is available.

Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Homebrew openclaw-cli
pkg:brew/openclaw-cli
Affected: ≥ 2026.1.29, < 2026.3.7 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.3.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.29"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.11.6",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.11.6"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nSandboxed requester sessions could reach host-side ACP session initialization through `/acp spawn`.\n\nOpenClaw already blocked `sessions_spawn({ runtime: \"acp\" })` from sandboxed sessions, but the slash-command path initialized ACP directly without applying the same host-runtime guard first.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- npm package: `openclaw`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Patched version: `\u003e= 2026.3.7`\n\n### Details\nACP sessions run on the host, not inside the OpenClaw sandbox. The direct ACP spawn path in `src/agents/acp-spawn.ts` already denied sandboxed requesters, but `/acp spawn` in `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts` called `initializeSession(...)` without first applying the same restriction.\n\nIn affected versions, an already authorized sender in a sandboxed session could use `/acp spawn` to cross from sandboxed chat context into host-side ACP runtime initialization when ACP was enabled and a backend was available.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `61000b8e4ded919ca1a825d4700db4cb3fdc56e3`\n\n### Fix Details\nThe fix introduced a shared ACP runtime-policy guard in `src/agents/acp-spawn.ts` and reused it from the `/acp spawn` handler in `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts` before any ACP backend initialization. Regression coverage was added in `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp.test.ts` to prove sandboxed `/acp spawn` requests are rejected early, while existing ACP spawn behavior for non-sandboxed sessions remains unchanged.\n\n### Release Process Note\nPatched version is pre-set to `2026.3.7` so the advisory can be published once that npm release is available.\n\nThanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-27646",
  "modified": "2026-11-21T09:13:20Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-9q36-67vc-rrwg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27646"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/61000b8e4ded919ca1a825d4700db4cb3fdc56e3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-mar-sandbox-escape-via-acp-spawn-command"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Sandboxed /acp spawn requests could initialize host ACP sessions",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-9q36-67vc-rrwg",
    "CVE-2026-27646"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.