BREW-MIKUTTER-CVE-2026-79771 (GHSA-V2FC-QM4H-8HQV)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-27 12:38 – Updated: 2026-10-07 22:55 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Nokogiri XSLT transform has a memory leak
Details

Summary

Nokogiri's Nokogiri::XSLT::Stylesheet#transform leaks a small heap allocation when passed a Ruby string parameter containing a null byte.

For applications that pass attacker-controlled input through XSLT.transform parameters, this may be a vector for a denial of service attack against long-running processes.

Mitigation

Upgrade to Nokogiri >= 1.19.3.

Users may also be able to mitigate this issue without upgrading by validating untrusted transform parameters before passing them to Nokogiri::XSLT::Stylesheet#transform.

Severity

The Nokogiri maintainers have evaluated this as Moderate Severity, CVSS 5.3.

Each leaked allocation is approximately 24–32 bytes, so meaningful memory growth requires sustained attacker-controlled traffic at high call rates. The bug does not cause memory corruption, information disclosure, or any change in the behavior of the transform itself, and the string-handling exception is raised as expected.

Applications that do not pass raw attacker-controlled bytes to XSLT parameters are unlikely to be affected in practice.

Resources

Credit

This vulnerability was responsibly reported by @Captainjack-kor.


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": null,
        "range_state": "affected",
        "resource": "nokogiri",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:gem/nokogiri@1.16.3",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "1.19.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "mikutter",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/mikutter"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.4.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "key": "pkg:gem/nokogiri@1.16.3",
        "name": "nokogiri",
        "resource": "nokogiri",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "1.16.3"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nNokogiri\u0027s `Nokogiri::XSLT::Stylesheet#transform` leaks a small heap allocation when passed a Ruby string parameter containing a null byte.\n\nFor applications that pass attacker-controlled input through `XSLT.transform` parameters, this may be a vector for a denial of service attack against long-running processes.\n\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to Nokogiri `\u003e= 1.19.3`.\n\nUsers may also be able to mitigate this issue without upgrading by validating untrusted transform parameters before passing them to `Nokogiri::XSLT::Stylesheet#transform`.\n\n\n## Severity\n\nThe Nokogiri maintainers have evaluated this as **Moderate Severity**, CVSS 5.3.\n\nEach leaked allocation is approximately 24\u201332 bytes, so meaningful memory growth requires sustained attacker-controlled traffic at high call rates. The bug does not cause memory corruption, information disclosure, or any change in the behavior of the transform itself, and the string-handling exception is raised as expected.\n\nApplications that do not pass raw attacker-controlled bytes to XSLT parameters are unlikely to be affected in practice.\n\n\n## Resources\n\n- [CWE-401: Missing Release of Memory after Effective Lifetime](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/401.html)\n\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was responsibly reported by @Captainjack-kor.",
  "id": "BREW-mikutter-CVE-2026-79771",
  "modified": "2026-10-07T22:55:10Z",
  "published": "2026-08-27T12:38:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri/security/advisories/GHSA-v2fc-qm4h-8hqv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79771"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sparklemotion/nokogiri"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nokogiri-before-memory-leak-via-xslt-transform"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nokogiri XSLT transform has a memory leak",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-v2fc-qm4h-8hqv",
    "CVE-2026-79771"
  ]
}



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