BREW-MAILCATCHER-CVE-202… (GHSA-P8X9-V4HV-2W4G)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-11-11 09:07 – Updated: 2026-11-11 09:07 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Rack: Multipart boundary ambiguity guard in Rack::Multipart::Parser can be bypassed with a quoted boundary value, allowing WAF bypass
Details

Summary

The guard added for CVE-2026-26961 (GHSA-vgpv-f759-9wx3), which rejects multipart requests with more than one boundary parameter, only inspects the part of the Content-Type header after the boundary it extracts. A Content-Type whose first boundary parameter is empty or begins with a quote, semicolon, or comma is skipped by the extraction pattern, so a second boundary parameter is accepted silently and Rack parses the body with a boundary that a conforming parser would not derive from the header.

Details

Rack::Multipart::Parser.parse_boundary extracts the boundary with a regular expression that uses a lazy prefix and a value class excluding ", ;, and ,. For a header such as multipart/form-data; boundary=";boundary=AaB03x" or multipart/form-data; boundary=; boundary=AaB03x, the pattern skips the first boundary= and anchors on the second, and the subsequent check for another boundary= in the remaining text finds nothing. Rack then uses AaB03x.

RFC 9110 parses the first header as a single parameter whose value is ;boundary=AaB03x, which is not a legal boundary under RFC 2046, so the only conformant outcome is rejection. Inspecting intermediaries that implement the standard grammar, such as ModSecurity, see a different boundary or no multipart body at all.

The fix counts boundary= occurrences across the entire header value and rejects the request when there is more than one.

Impact

As with CVE-2026-26961, an attacker can craft a multipart request that a web application firewall or other inspecting proxy in front of a Rack application interprets differently from Rack, so form fields and file uploads reach the application without inspection. Rack itself grants no capability beyond that of a well-formed request with the same body. All supported versions, including 2.2, are affected.

Mitigation

  • Update to a patched version of Rack.
  • Reject requests whose Content-Type contains more than one boundary parameter at the reverse proxy.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": null,
        "range_state": "affected",
        "resource": "rack",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:gem/rack@3.2.7",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "3.2.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "mailcatcher",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/mailcatcher"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "key": "pkg:gem/rack@3.2.7",
        "name": "rack",
        "resource": "rack",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "3.2.7"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe guard added for CVE-2026-26961 (GHSA-vgpv-f759-9wx3), which rejects multipart requests with more than one `boundary` parameter, only inspects the part of the `Content-Type` header after the boundary it extracts. A `Content-Type` whose first `boundary` parameter is empty or begins with a quote, semicolon, or comma is skipped by the extraction pattern, so a second `boundary` parameter is accepted silently and Rack parses the body with a boundary that a conforming parser would not derive from the header.\n\n## Details\n\n`Rack::Multipart::Parser.parse_boundary` extracts the boundary with a regular expression that uses a lazy prefix and a value class excluding `\"`, `;`, and `,`. For a header such as `multipart/form-data; boundary=\";boundary=AaB03x\"` or `multipart/form-data; boundary=; boundary=AaB03x`, the pattern skips the first `boundary=` and anchors on the second, and the subsequent check for another `boundary=` in the remaining text finds nothing. Rack then uses `AaB03x`.\n\nRFC 9110 parses the first header as a single parameter whose value is `;boundary=AaB03x`, which is not a legal boundary under RFC 2046, so the only conformant outcome is rejection. Inspecting intermediaries that implement the standard grammar, such as ModSecurity, see a different boundary or no multipart body at all.\n\nThe fix counts `boundary=` occurrences across the entire header value and rejects the request when there is more than one.\n\n## Impact\n\nAs with CVE-2026-26961, an attacker can craft a multipart request that a web application firewall or other inspecting proxy in front of a Rack application interprets differently from Rack, so form fields and file uploads reach the application without inspection. Rack itself grants no capability beyond that of a well-formed request with the same body. All supported versions, including 2.2, are affected.\n\n## Mitigation\n\n* Update to a patched version of Rack.\n* Reject requests whose `Content-Type` contains more than one `boundary` parameter at the reverse proxy.",
  "id": "BREW-mailcatcher-CVE-2026-125108",
  "modified": "2026-11-11T09:07:56Z",
  "published": "2026-11-11T09:07:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-p8x9-v4hv-2w4g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125108"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/19a1a19cb4da97d61c8d5effeb2e927c44370ae9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/a29512324265790a5536b830490075d0d79323be"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/d5e928b803da30b8e40171dbd4be39bed7daa6fa"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/releases/tag/v2.2.25"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/releases/tag/v3.1.23"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/releases/tag/v3.2.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rack/GHSA-p8x9-v4hv-2w4g.yml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Rack: Multipart boundary ambiguity guard in Rack::Multipart::Parser can be bypassed with a quoted boundary value, allowing WAF bypass",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-p8x9-v4hv-2w4g",
    "CVE-2026-125108"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.