BREW-GPTLINE-CVE-2026-78680 (GHSA-6HWM-XVPH-95VM)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-09-02 09:04 – Updated: 2026-10-27 09:31 – Source websiteTwo NLTK sites executed the Graphviz dot program by bare name, so process creation resolved it via the search path — and on Windows via the current working directory — rather than a validated absolute location. An attacker who can place a file named dot where resolution looks (the CWD on Windows, or a writable/relative entry such as . on PATH) has their binary executed in place of Graphviz (arbitrary code execution).
Affected (<= 3.10.2):
- nltk.parse.dependencygraph.dot2img — called find_binary("dot") but discarded the returned validated path and then ran the bare name ["dot", ...], so the validation had no effect.
- nltk.translate.api.AlignedSent._repr_svg_ — ran the bare name with no validation at all (IPython SVG rendering).
This is the same class already fixed for the senna, weka, boxer, malt, repp and hunpos wrappers. nltk.internals.find_binary refuses a CWD-relative match for a bare tool name and returns only a trusted absolute path; the fix runs that path in both sites.
Attack demonstration
Captured output, not illustrative. A ./dot that writes a PWNED marker, planted in the CWD with . prepended to PATH.
The vulnerable behaviour (old bare-name exec):
Control (OLD behavior) — bare ['dot'] in this dir with '.' on PATH:
bare ['dot'] executed planted binary = True
The patched functions refuse it:
FIXED code, with ./dot planted and '.' on PATH:
dependencygraph.dot2img : Exception "Cannot find the dot binary..." | planted-binary-executed=False safe
AlignedSent._repr_svg_ : Exception "Cannot find the dot binary..." | planted-binary-executed=False safe
And find_binary itself was attacked directly (the fix trusts nothing else):
Attack 1: ./dot in CWD, no dot on PATH -> LookupError (refused) safe
Attack 2: ./dot/dot (dir 'dot' holding 'dot') -> LookupError (refused) safe
Attack 3: '.' on PATH + ./dot -> LookupError (refused) safe
Attack 4: attacker-writable ABSOLUTE dir on PATH -> returned /…/evilbin/dot (absolute)
Attack 4 is out of scope: trusting an absolute directory that is already on PATH is the operating system's own trust model — an attacker who can write to a PATH directory owns the account regardless of NLTK. find_binary defends specifically against the CWD/relative injection that bare-name exec is vulnerable to (attacks 1–3), which is exactly what this fix inherits.
Environment: python 3.13.7. dot is not required to reproduce — the planted binary is the payload.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "nltk",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/nltk@3.10.4",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.10.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "gptline",
"purl": "pkg:brew/gptline"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.8"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.8_23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/nltk@3.10.4",
"name": "nltk",
"resource": "nltk",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.10.4"
}
]
},
"details": "Two NLTK sites executed the Graphviz `dot` program by bare name, so process creation resolved it via the search path \u2014 and on Windows via the current working directory \u2014 rather than a validated absolute location. An attacker who can place a file named `dot` where resolution looks (the CWD on Windows, or a writable/relative entry such as `.` on `PATH`) has their binary executed in place of Graphviz (arbitrary code execution).\n\nAffected (\u003c= 3.10.2):\n- `nltk.parse.dependencygraph.dot2img` \u2014 called `find_binary(\"dot\")` but discarded the returned validated path and then ran the bare name `[\"dot\", ...]`, so the validation had no effect.\n- `nltk.translate.api.AlignedSent._repr_svg_` \u2014 ran the bare name with no validation at all (IPython SVG rendering).\n\nThis is the same class already fixed for the senna, weka, boxer, malt, repp and hunpos wrappers. `nltk.internals.find_binary` refuses a CWD-relative match for a bare tool name and returns only a trusted absolute path; the fix runs that path in both sites.\n\n---\n\n## Attack demonstration\nCaptured output, not illustrative. A `./dot` that writes a `PWNED` marker, planted in the CWD with `.` prepended to `PATH`.\n\n**The vulnerable behaviour (old bare-name exec):**\n```\nControl (OLD behavior) \u2014 bare [\u0027dot\u0027] in this dir with \u0027.\u0027 on PATH:\n bare [\u0027dot\u0027] executed planted binary = True\n```\n\n**The patched functions refuse it:**\n```\nFIXED code, with ./dot planted and \u0027.\u0027 on PATH:\n dependencygraph.dot2img : Exception \"Cannot find the dot binary...\" | planted-binary-executed=False safe\n AlignedSent._repr_svg_ : Exception \"Cannot find the dot binary...\" | planted-binary-executed=False safe\n```\n\n**And `find_binary` itself was attacked directly** (the fix trusts nothing else):\n```\nAttack 1: ./dot in CWD, no dot on PATH -\u003e LookupError (refused) safe\nAttack 2: ./dot/dot (dir \u0027dot\u0027 holding \u0027dot\u0027) -\u003e LookupError (refused) safe\nAttack 3: \u0027.\u0027 on PATH + ./dot -\u003e LookupError (refused) safe\nAttack 4: attacker-writable ABSOLUTE dir on PATH -\u003e returned /\u2026/evilbin/dot (absolute)\n```\nAttack 4 is out of scope: trusting an absolute directory that is already on `PATH` is the operating system\u0027s own trust model \u2014 an attacker who can write to a `PATH` directory owns the account regardless of NLTK. `find_binary` defends specifically against the CWD/relative injection that bare-name exec is vulnerable to (attacks 1\u20133), which is exactly what this fix inherits.\n\nEnvironment: python 3.13.7. `dot` is not required to reproduce \u2014 the planted binary is the payload.",
"id": "BREW-gptline-CVE-2026-78680",
"modified": "2026-10-27T09:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T09:04:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-6hwm-xvph-95vm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78680"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/1a3cd1764ab3deb084fb66d0ffb4873717659538"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-arbitrary-code-execution-via-graphviz-dot-binary"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "NLTK: Uncontrolled search path when invoking the Graphviz \u0027dot\u0027 binary",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-6hwm-xvph-95vm",
"CVE-2026-78680",
"PYSEC-2026-3868"
]
}
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