BREW-GALLERY-DL-CVE-2024-37891 (GHSA-34JH-P97F-MPXF)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 16:49 – Updated: 2026-09-20 18:14 – Source websiteWhen using urllib3's proxy support with ProxyManager, the Proxy-Authorization header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected.
However, when sending HTTP requests without using urllib3's proxy support, it's possible to accidentally configure the Proxy-Authorization header even though it won't have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn't treat the Proxy-Authorization HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn't strip the header on cross-origin redirects.
Because this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the Proxy-Authorization header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident.
Users should use urllib3's proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the Proxy-Authorization header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren't using the correct approach.
Affected usages
We believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:
- Setting the
Proxy-Authorizationheader without using urllib3's built-in proxy support. - Not disabling HTTP redirects.
- Either not using an HTTPS origin server or for the proxy or target origin to redirect to a malicious origin.
Remediation
- Using the
Proxy-Authorizationheader with urllib3'sProxyManager. - Disabling HTTP redirects using
redirects=Falsewhen sending requests. - Not using the
Proxy-Authorizationheader.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "urllib3",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/urllib3@2.8.0",
"upstream_fixed_in": "2.2.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "gallery-dl",
"purl": "pkg:brew/gallery-dl"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.32.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/urllib3@2.8.0",
"name": "urllib3",
"resource": "urllib3",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "2.8.0"
}
]
},
"details": "When using urllib3\u0027s proxy support with `ProxyManager`, the `Proxy-Authorization` header is only sent to the configured proxy, as expected.\n\nHowever, when sending HTTP requests *without* using urllib3\u0027s proxy support, it\u0027s possible to accidentally configure the `Proxy-Authorization` header even though it won\u0027t have any effect as the request is not using a forwarding proxy or a tunneling proxy. In those cases, urllib3 doesn\u0027t treat the `Proxy-Authorization` HTTP header as one carrying authentication material and thus doesn\u0027t strip the header on cross-origin redirects.\n\nBecause this is a highly unlikely scenario, we believe the severity of this vulnerability is low for almost all users. Out of an abundance of caution urllib3 will automatically strip the `Proxy-Authorization` header during cross-origin redirects to avoid the small chance that users are doing this on accident.\n\nUsers should use urllib3\u0027s proxy support or disable automatic redirects to achieve safe processing of the `Proxy-Authorization` header, but we still decided to strip the header by default in order to further protect users who aren\u0027t using the correct approach.\n\n## Affected usages\n\nWe believe the number of usages affected by this advisory is low. It requires all of the following to be true to be exploited:\n\n* Setting the `Proxy-Authorization` header without using urllib3\u0027s built-in proxy support.\n* Not disabling HTTP redirects.\n* Either not using an HTTPS origin server or for the proxy or target origin to redirect to a malicious origin.\n\n## Remediation\n\n* Using the `Proxy-Authorization` header with urllib3\u0027s `ProxyManager`.\n* Disabling HTTP redirects using `redirects=False` when sending requests.\n* Not using the `Proxy-Authorization` header.",
"id": "BREW-gallery-dl-CVE-2024-37891",
"modified": "2026-09-20T18:14:21Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T16:49:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37891"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/40b6d1605814dd1db0a46e202d6e56f2e4c9a468"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/commit/accff72ecc2f6cf5a76d9570198a93ac7c90270e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/12/msg00020.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240822-0003"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/proxy-authorization-header-handling-vulnerability-in-urllib3-cve-2024-37891"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "urllib3\u0027s Proxy-Authorization request header isn\u0027t stripped during cross-origin redirects",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf",
"CVE-2024-37891",
"PYSEC-2026-1995"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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