BREW-ANSIBLE@13-CVE-2024-30251 (GHSA-5M98-QGG9-WH84)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 16:35 – Updated: 2026-09-10 18:51 – Source websiteSummary
An attacker can send a specially crafted POST (multipart/form-data) request. When the aiohttp server processes it, the server will enter an infinite loop and be unable to process any further requests.
Impact
An attacker can stop the application from serving requests after sending a single request.
For anyone needing to patch older versions of aiohttp, the minimum diff needed to resolve the issue is (located in _read_chunk_from_length()):
diff --git a/aiohttp/multipart.py b/aiohttp/multipart.py
index 227be605c..71fc2654a 100644
--- a/aiohttp/multipart.py
+++ b/aiohttp/multipart.py
@@ -338,6 +338,8 @@ class BodyPartReader:
assert self._length is not None, "Content-Length required for chunked read"
chunk_size = min(size, self._length - self._read_bytes)
chunk = await self._content.read(chunk_size)
+ if self._content.at_eof():
+ self._at_eof = True
return chunk
async def _read_chunk_from_stream(self, size: int) -> bytes:
This does however introduce some very minor issues with handling form data. So, if possible, it would be recommended to also backport the changes in: https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/cebe526b9c34dc3a3da9140409db63014bc4cf19 https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/7eecdff163ccf029fbb1ddc9de4169d4aaeb6597 https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/f21c6f2ca512a026ce7f0f6c6311f62d6a638866
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": "bump",
"range_state": "fixed",
"resource": "aiohttp",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/aiohttp@3.14.3",
"upstream_fixed_in": "3.9.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "ansible@13",
"purl": "pkg:brew/ansible%4013"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "13.8.0_2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/aiohttp@3.14.3",
"name": "aiohttp",
"resource": "aiohttp",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "3.14.3"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn attacker can send a specially crafted POST (multipart/form-data) request. When the aiohttp server processes it, the server will enter an infinite loop and be unable to process any further requests.\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker can stop the application from serving requests after sending a single request.\n\n-------\n\nFor anyone needing to patch older versions of aiohttp, the minimum diff needed to resolve the issue is (located in `_read_chunk_from_length()`):\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/aiohttp/multipart.py b/aiohttp/multipart.py\nindex 227be605c..71fc2654a 100644\n--- a/aiohttp/multipart.py\n+++ b/aiohttp/multipart.py\n@@ -338,6 +338,8 @@ class BodyPartReader:\n assert self._length is not None, \"Content-Length required for chunked read\"\n chunk_size = min(size, self._length - self._read_bytes)\n chunk = await self._content.read(chunk_size)\n+ if self._content.at_eof():\n+ self._at_eof = True\n return chunk\n \n async def _read_chunk_from_stream(self, size: int) -\u003e bytes:\n```\n\nThis does however introduce some very minor issues with handling form data. So, if possible, it would be recommended to also backport the changes in:\nhttps://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/cebe526b9c34dc3a3da9140409db63014bc4cf19\nhttps://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/7eecdff163ccf029fbb1ddc9de4169d4aaeb6597\nhttps://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/f21c6f2ca512a026ce7f0f6c6311f62d6a638866",
"id": "BREW-ansible@13-CVE-2024-30251",
"modified": "2026-09-10T18:51:29Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T16:35:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-5m98-qgg9-wh84"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30251"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/7eecdff163ccf029fbb1ddc9de4169d4aaeb6597"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/cebe526b9c34dc3a3da9140409db63014bc4cf19"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/f21c6f2ca512a026ce7f0f6c6311f62d6a638866"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/02/msg00002.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/02/4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "aiohttp vulnerable to Denial of Service when trying to parse malformed POST requests",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-5m98-qgg9-wh84",
"CVE-2024-30251",
"PYSEC-2026-1098"
]
}
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