BREW-ANSIBLE@12-GHSA-XMJ… (GHSA-XMJ3-9GF7-H52W)
Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-10-29 21:29 – Updated: 2026-10-29 21:29 – Source websiteSummary
On Windows, attacker-controlled content in a wheel's
.dist-info/namespace_packages.txt can cause setuptools' legacy wheel
installation path to create an __init__.py outside the requested
destination_eggdir.
The attacker can influence the destination path, but not the contents of the created file.
Details
Tested setuptools commit:
6ead555c5fb29bc57fe6105b1bffc163f56fd558
Relevant source:
setuptools/wheel.py
SHA-256:
359b7e0d5dd8c3135653abe08a8ed5dc0352eadfd7df22cb5e2b5303b7c3cafd
The relevant call path is:
Wheel(wheel_path).install_as_egg(destination)
→ _install_as_egg
→ _convert_metadata
→ _fix_namespace_packages
A wheel can provide attacker-controlled content in:
<distribution>.dist-info/namespace_packages.txt
The namespace value is eventually used approximately as:
mod_dir = os.path.join(destination_eggdir, *mod.split('.'))
mod_init = os.path.join(mod_dir, '__init__.py')
If mod is a Windows drive-qualified absolute path containing no dots,
mod.split('.') preserves it as a single component.
On Windows, os.path.join(destination_eggdir, absolute_component) discards
the original base directory and resolves to the attacker-supplied absolute
path.
The existing wheel filename and ZIP traversal checks do not validate this
metadata value before it is subsequently interpreted as a filesystem path.
```markdown
### PoC
The reproduction was performed entirely inside a disposable temporary
directory.
Layout:
```text
sandbox/
destination/
outside/
input/
canary.txt
A synthetic wheel was created containing:
demo_pkg-1.0.dist-info/namespace_packages.txt
whose content was the absolute path of:
sandbox\outside
The real acquired setuptools implementation was then invoked:
setuptools.wheel.Wheel(synthetic_wheel).install_as_egg(
sandbox_destination
)
The operation completed without exception.
Expected metadata was created under:
sandbox\destination\EGG-INFO
but setuptools also created:
sandbox\outside\__init__.py
The file did not exist before execution.
Its contents were:
__import__('pkg_resources').declare_namespace(__name__)
The unrelated canary remained byte-identical.
The sandbox was deleted after recording the evidence. ```
Impact
A crafted wheel can cause setuptools to create a fixed-content
__init__.py outside the intended installation directory at a
filesystem path influenced by the wheel, with the permissions of the
process performing the installation.
The demonstrated reproduction required the target parent directory to already exist.
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"fix": null,
"range_state": "affected",
"resource": "setuptools",
"resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@84.0.0",
"upstream_fixed_in": "84.1.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Homebrew",
"name": "ansible@12",
"purl": "pkg:brew/ansible%4012"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "12.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"confidence": "high",
"source": "matched",
"strategy": "registry",
"upstream_evidence": [
{
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"key": "pkg:pypi/setuptools@84.0.0",
"name": "setuptools",
"resource": "setuptools",
"strategy": "registry",
"subject_version": "84.0.0"
}
]
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOn Windows, attacker-controlled content in a wheel\u0027s\n`.dist-info/namespace_packages.txt` can cause setuptools\u0027 legacy wheel\ninstallation path to create an `__init__.py` outside the requested\n`destination_eggdir`.\n\nThe attacker can influence the destination path, but not the contents of\nthe created file.\n\n### Details\n\nTested setuptools commit:\n\n`6ead555c5fb29bc57fe6105b1bffc163f56fd558`\n\nRelevant source:\n\n`setuptools/wheel.py`\n\nSHA-256:\n\n`359b7e0d5dd8c3135653abe08a8ed5dc0352eadfd7df22cb5e2b5303b7c3cafd`\n\nThe relevant call path is:\n\n`Wheel(wheel_path).install_as_egg(destination)`\n\u2192 `_install_as_egg`\n\u2192 `_convert_metadata`\n\u2192 `_fix_namespace_packages`\n\nA wheel can provide attacker-controlled content in:\n\n`\u003cdistribution\u003e.dist-info/namespace_packages.txt`\n\nThe namespace value is eventually used approximately as:\n\n```python\nmod_dir = os.path.join(destination_eggdir, *mod.split(\u0027.\u0027))\nmod_init = os.path.join(mod_dir, \u0027__init__.py\u0027)\n\nIf mod is a Windows drive-qualified absolute path containing no dots,\nmod.split(\u0027.\u0027) preserves it as a single component.\nOn Windows, os.path.join(destination_eggdir, absolute_component) discards\nthe original base directory and resolves to the attacker-supplied absolute\npath.\nThe existing wheel filename and ZIP traversal checks do not validate this\nmetadata value before it is subsequently interpreted as a filesystem path.\n\n```markdown\n### PoC\n\nThe reproduction was performed entirely inside a disposable temporary\ndirectory.\n\nLayout:\n\n```text\nsandbox/\n destination/\n outside/\n input/\n canary.txt\n```\n\nA synthetic wheel was created containing:\n\n`demo_pkg-1.0.dist-info/namespace_packages.txt`\n\nwhose content was the absolute path of:\n\n`sandbox\\outside`\n\nThe real acquired setuptools implementation was then invoked:\n\n```python\nsetuptools.wheel.Wheel(synthetic_wheel).install_as_egg(\n sandbox_destination\n)\n```\n\nThe operation completed without exception.\n\nExpected metadata was created under:\n\n`sandbox\\destination\\EGG-INFO`\n\nbut setuptools also created:\n\n`sandbox\\outside\\__init__.py`\n\nThe file did not exist before execution.\n\nIts contents were:\n\n```python\n__import__(\u0027pkg_resources\u0027).declare_namespace(__name__)\n```\n\nThe unrelated canary remained byte-identical.\n\nThe sandbox was deleted after recording the evidence.\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n\nA crafted wheel can cause setuptools to create a fixed-content\n`__init__.py` outside the intended installation directory at a\nfilesystem path influenced by the wheel, with the permissions of the\nprocess performing the installation.\n\nThe demonstrated reproduction required the target parent directory to\nalready exist.",
"id": "BREW-ansible@12-GHSA-xmj3-9gf7-h52w",
"modified": "2026-10-29T21:29:09Z",
"published": "2026-10-29T21:29:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/security/advisories/GHSA-xmj3-9gf7-h52w"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/pull/5329"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/commit/6d07b8d17890dda58d944ac51e58f54af92d52af"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/releases/tag/v84.1.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "setuptools: Windows path escape via namespace_packages.txt during legacy wheel installation Description",
"upstream": [
"GHSA-xmj3-9gf7-h52w"
]
}
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