BREW-AIDER-CVE-2026-35030 (GHSA-JJHC-V7C2-5HH6)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 16:35 – Updated: 2026-11-17 09:52 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
LiteLLM: Authentication bypass via OIDC userinfo cache key collision
Details

Impact

When JWT authentication is enabled (enable_jwt_auth: true), the OIDC userinfo cache uses token[:20] as the cache key. JWT headers produced by the same signing algorithm generate identical first 20 characters.

This configuration option is not enabled by default. Most instances are not affected.

An unauthenticated attacker can craft a token whose first 20 characters match a legitimate user's cached token. On cache hit, the attacker inherits the legitimate user's identity and permissions. This affects deployments with JWT/OIDC authentication enabled.

Patches

Fixed in v1.83.0. The cache key now uses the full hash of the JWT token.

Workarounds

Disable OIDC userinfo caching by setting the cache TTL to 0, or disable JWT authentication entirely.

Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Homebrew aider
pkg:brew/aider
Affected: ≥ 0.47.1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": null,
        "range_state": "affected",
        "resource": "litellm",
        "resource_purl": "pkg:pypi/litellm@1.81.10",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "1.83.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "aider",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/aider"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.47.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "key": "pkg:pypi/litellm@1.81.10",
        "name": "litellm",
        "resource": "litellm",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "1.81.10"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "###  Impact\n\nWhen JWT authentication is enabled (`enable_jwt_auth: true`), the OIDC userinfo cache uses `token[:20]` as the cache key. JWT headers produced by the same signing algorithm generate identical first 20 characters.\n\nThis configuration option is not enabled by default. **Most instances are not affected.**\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can craft a token whose first 20 characters match a legitimate user\u0027s cached token. On cache hit, the attacker inherits the legitimate user\u0027s identity and permissions. This affects deployments with JWT/OIDC authentication enabled.\n\n###  Patches\n\nFixed in v1.83.0. The cache key now uses the full hash of the JWT token.\n\n###  Workarounds\n\nDisable OIDC userinfo caching by setting the cache TTL to 0, or disable JWT authentication entirely.",
  "id": "BREW-aider-CVE-2026-35030",
  "modified": "2026-11-17T09:52:38Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T16:35:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/security/advisories/GHSA-jjhc-v7c2-5hh6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35030"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:13545"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:28960"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:30056"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-35030"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2455509"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/litellm/PYSEC-2026-390.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/litellm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-35030.json"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LiteLLM: Authentication bypass via OIDC userinfo cache key collision",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-jjhc-v7c2-5hh6",
    "CVE-2026-35030",
    "PYSEC-2026-390"
  ]
}



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