Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15, The content-header BodySize (a uint64) was stored without validation against max_message_size. The size check ran only when assembly completed. By declaring body_size = 2^63-1 and then streaming fragments, a client ensured that check_msg_size never fired, so the accumulated body size went unbounded. A reader process accumulates memory until the memory alarm fires, degrading all publishers cluster-wide, or until the node runs out of memory. The memory alarm provides only partial mitigation, since it is reactive rather than preventive. AMQP 0-9-1 is the most widely used protocol, and any publisher can trigger this condition. Preconditions include Any authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 client with publish permission can exploit this.. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Bitnami",
"name": "rabbitmq",
"purl": "pkg:bitnami/rabbitmq"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.13.15"
},
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.20"
},
{
"introduced": "4.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.11"
},
{
"introduced": "4.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.6"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-67235"
],
"database_specific": {
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:vmware:rabbitmq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15, The content-header BodySize (a uint64) was stored without validation against max_message_size. The size check ran only when assembly completed. By declaring body_size = 2^63-1 and then streaming fragments, a client ensured that check_msg_size never fired, so the accumulated body size went unbounded. A reader process accumulates memory until the memory alarm fires, degrading all publishers cluster-wide, or until the node runs out of memory. The memory alarm provides only partial mitigation, since it is reactive rather than preventive. AMQP 0-9-1 is the most widely used protocol, and any publisher can trigger this condition. Preconditions include Any authenticated AMQP 0-9-1 client with publish permission can exploit this.. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.0, 4.2.6, 4.1.11, 4.0.20, and 3.13.15.",
"id": "BIT-rabbitmq-2026-67235",
"modified": "2026-10-01T09:55:18.588Z",
"published": "2026-10-01T09:33:30.002Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.3.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-q8g2-pc7m-m3jw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67235"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.6.2",
"summary": "RabbitMQ: AMQP 0-9-1 body assembly never validates accumulated size"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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