Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Published
2026-10-01 09:33
Modified
2026-10-01 09:55
Summary
RabbitMQ: Consistent-hash exchange unbounded weight
Details

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, add_binding/3 parses the routing key as an integer weight N and computes ring positions with lists:seq(NextN0, NextN0 + N - 1). validate_binding/2 only checks N >= 1 , no upper bound. The resulting list is stored in the exchange's Khepri record, replicated cluster-wide, and reloaded on restart. A user with write permission on a consistent-hash exchange and read on a queue can create a binding whose routing key (the hash-ring weight) is an arbitrarily large integer. The broker allocates a list of that many integers via lists:seq/2 and persists it to Khepri across all cluster nodes , a single binding with weight 100000000 allocates ~800 MB on every node and survives restarts. Preconditions include rabbitmq_consistent_hash_exchange plugin enabled write permission on a consistent-hash exchange + read on a queue (standard binding perms). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "rabbitmq",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/rabbitmq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.13.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.13.15"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.20"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "4.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.11"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "4.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "type": "CVSS_V4"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67219"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:vmware:rabbitmq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, add_binding/3 parses the routing key as an integer weight N and computes ring positions with lists:seq(NextN0, NextN0 + N - 1). validate_binding/2 only checks N \u003e= 1 , no upper bound. The resulting list is stored in the exchange\u0027s Khepri record, replicated cluster-wide, and reloaded on restart. A user with write permission on a consistent-hash exchange and read on a queue can create a binding whose routing key (the hash-ring weight) is an arbitrarily large integer. The broker allocates a list of that many integers via lists:seq/2 and persists it to Khepri across all cluster nodes , a single binding with weight 100000000 allocates ~800 MB on every node and survives restarts. Preconditions include rabbitmq_consistent_hash_exchange plugin enabled write permission on a consistent-hash exchange + read on a queue (standard binding perms). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.",
  "id": "BIT-rabbitmq-2026-67219",
  "modified": "2026-10-01T09:55:18.588Z",
  "published": "2026-10-01T09:33:03.838Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.3.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-m8pg-4x2h-jvgr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67219"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.6.2",
  "summary": "RabbitMQ: Consistent-hash exchange unbounded weight"
}



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