Vulnerability-Lookup

Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb

Published

2026-10-01 09:33

Modified

2026-10-20 09:10

Summary

RabbitMQ: Consistent-hash exchange unbounded weight

Details

RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, add_binding/3 parses the routing key as an integer weight N and computes ring positions with lists:seq(NextN0, NextN0 + N - 1). validate_binding/2 only checks N >= 1 , no upper bound. The resulting list is stored in the exchange's Khepri record, replicated cluster-wide, and reloaded on restart. A user with write permission on a consistent-hash exchange and read on a queue can create a binding whose routing key (the hash-ring weight) is an arbitrarily large integer. The broker allocates a list of that many integers via lists:seq/2 and persists it to Khepri across all cluster nodes , a single binding with weight 100000000 allocates ~800 MB on every node and survives restarts. Preconditions include rabbitmq_consistent_hash_exchange plugin enabled write permission on a consistent-hash exchange + read on a queue (standard binding perms). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "rabbitmq",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/rabbitmq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.13.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.13.15"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.20"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "4.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.11"
            },
            {
              "introduced": "4.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "type": "CVSS_V4"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-67219"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:vmware:rabbitmq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, add_binding/3 parses the routing key as an integer weight N and computes ring positions with lists:seq(NextN0, NextN0 + N - 1). validate_binding/2 only checks N \u003e= 1 , no upper bound. The resulting list is stored in the exchange\u0027s Khepri record, replicated cluster-wide, and reloaded on restart. A user with write permission on a consistent-hash exchange and read on a queue can create a binding whose routing key (the hash-ring weight) is an arbitrarily large integer. The broker allocates a list of that many integers via lists:seq/2 and persists it to Khepri across all cluster nodes , a single binding with weight 100000000 allocates ~800 MB on every node and survives restarts. Preconditions include rabbitmq_consistent_hash_exchange plugin enabled write permission on a consistent-hash exchange + read on a queue (standard binding perms). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.",
  "id": "BIT-rabbitmq-2026-67219",
  "modified": "2026-10-20T09:10:19.569Z",
  "published": "2026-10-01T09:33:03.838Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ARTICLE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ARTICLE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.3.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-m8pg-4x2h-jvgr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67219"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.6.2",
  "summary": "RabbitMQ: Consistent-hash exchange unbounded weight"
}

CVE-2026-67219 (GCVE-0-2026-67219)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-23 20:38 – Updated: 2026-09-24 14:20

Title

RabbitMQ: Consistent-hash exchange unbounded weight

Summary

Severity

6 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-24 14:19 UTC

CWE

CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7843 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/secur…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/relea…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/relea…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
rabbitmq	rabbitmq-server	Affected: >= 3.13.0, < 3.13.15 Affected: >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.20 Affected: >= 4.1.0, < 4.1.11 Affected: >= 4.2.0, < 4.2.6

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-67219",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-24T14:19:46.502402Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-24T14:20:08.627Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "rabbitmq-server",
          "vendor": "rabbitmq",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 3.13.0, \u003c 3.13.15"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 4.0.0, \u003c 4.0.20"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 4.1.0, \u003c 4.1.11"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 4.2.0, \u003c 4.2.6"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, add_binding/3 parses the routing key as an integer weight N and computes ring positions with lists:seq(NextN0, NextN0 + N - 1). validate_binding/2 only checks N \u003e= 1 , no upper bound. The resulting list is stored in the exchange\u0027s Khepri record, replicated cluster-wide, and reloaded on restart. A user with write permission on a consistent-hash exchange and read on a queue can create a binding whose routing key (the hash-ring weight) is an arbitrarily large integer. The broker allocates a list of that many integers via lists:seq/2 and persists it to Khepri across all cluster nodes , a single binding with weight 100000000 allocates ~800 MB on every node and survives restarts. Preconditions include rabbitmq_consistent_hash_exchange plugin enabled write permission on a consistent-hash exchange + read on a queue (standard binding perms). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 6,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-770",
              "description": "CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T20:38:42.653Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-m8pg-4x2h-jvgr",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-m8pg-4x2h-jvgr"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.6",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.6"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.3.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.3.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-m8pg-4x2h-jvgr",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "RabbitMQ: Consistent-hash exchange unbounded weight"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-67219",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-23T20:38:42.653Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-28T19:50:39.437Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-24T14:20:08.627Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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