BDU:2024-08751 (CVE-2024-6207)

Vulnerability from fstec – Published: 2024-10-30 – Updated: 2024-10-30 – View on bdu.fstec.ru Fixed
VLAI
Title
Уязвимость компонента CIP Message Handler микропрограммного обеспечения программируемых логических контроллеров Rockwell Automation ControlLogix 5580, CompactLogix 5380, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3, CompactLogix 5480, FactoryTalk Logix Echo, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании
Summary
Уязвимость компонента CIP Message Handler микропрограммного обеспечения программируемых логических контроллеров Rockwell Automation ControlLogix 5580, CompactLogix 5380, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3, CompactLogix 5480, FactoryTalk Logix Echo связана с ошибками при обработке входных данных. Эксплуатация уязвимости может позволить нарушителю, действующему удалённо, вызвать отказ в обслуживании
Class
Code vulnerability
Status
Confirmed by the vendor
Exploitation
Resource manipulation
Incidents
Being clarified
Remediation
Software update
CWE
  • CWE-20 - Недостаточная проверка вводимых данных
Aliases
Impacted products
Vendors
Rockwell Automation Inc.
Products
ControlLogix 5580, GuardLogix 5580, CompactLogix 5380, CompactLogix 5480, ControlLogix 5580 Process, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3, FactoryTalk Logix Echo
Versions
от 35.011 до 35.013 (ControlLogix 5580), от 35.011 до 35.013 (GuardLogix 5580), от 35.011 до 35.013 (CompactLogix 5380), от 35.011 до 35.013 (CompactLogix 5480), от 28.011 до 33.017 (ControlLogix 5580), от 34.011 до 34.014 (ControlLogix 5580), от 36.011 до 36.011 (ControlLogix 5580), от 33.011 до 33.017 (ControlLogix 5580 Process), от 34.011 до 34.014 (ControlLogix 5580 Process), от 35.011 до 35.013 (ControlLogix 5580 Process), от 36.011 до 36.011 (ControlLogix 5580 Process), от 31.011 до 33.017 (GuardLogix 5580), от 34.011 до 34.014 (GuardLogix 5580), от 36.011 до 36.011 (GuardLogix 5580), от 28.011 до 33.017 (CompactLogix 5380), от 34.011 до 34.014 (CompactLogix 5380), от 36.011 до 36.011 (CompactLogix 5380), от 31.011 до 33.017 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2), от 34.011 до 34.014 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2), от 35.011 до 35.013 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2), от 36.011 до 36.011 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2), от 32.013 до 33.017 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3), от 34.011 до 34.014 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3), от 35.011 до 35.013 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3), от 36.011 до 36.011 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3), от 32.011 до 33.017 (CompactLogix 5480), от 34.011 до 34.014 (CompactLogix 5480), от 36.011 до 36.011 (CompactLogix 5480), от 33.011 до 33.017 (FactoryTalk Logix Echo), от 34.011 до 34.014 (FactoryTalk Logix Echo), от 35.011 до 35.013 (FactoryTalk Logix Echo), от 36.011 до 36.011 (FactoryTalk Logix Echo)
Product types
Firmware, Средство АСУ ТП, ПО программно-аппаратного средства АСУ ТП, Industrial control system software
Mitigations
Использование рекомендаций производителя: https://www.rockwellautomation.com/en-us/trust-center/security-advisories/advisory.SD1707.html

{
  "CVSS 2.0": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C",
  "CVSS 3.0": "AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
  "CVSS 4.0": null,
  "remediation_\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440": null,
  "remediation_\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435": null,
  "\u0412\u0435\u043d\u0434\u043e\u0440 \u041f\u041e": "Rockwell Automation Inc.",
  "\u0412\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u044f \u041f\u041e": "\u043e\u0442 35.011 \u0434\u043e 35.013 (ControlLogix 5580), \u043e\u0442 35.011 \u0434\u043e 35.013 (GuardLogix 5580), \u043e\u0442 35.011 \u0434\u043e 35.013 (CompactLogix 5380), \u043e\u0442 35.011 \u0434\u043e 35.013 (CompactLogix 5480), \u043e\u0442 28.011 \u0434\u043e 33.017 (ControlLogix 5580), \u043e\u0442 34.011 \u0434\u043e 34.014 (ControlLogix 5580), \u043e\u0442 36.011 \u0434\u043e 36.011 (ControlLogix 5580), \u043e\u0442 33.011 \u0434\u043e 33.017 (ControlLogix 5580 Process), \u043e\u0442 34.011 \u0434\u043e 34.014 (ControlLogix 5580 Process), \u043e\u0442 35.011 \u0434\u043e 35.013 (ControlLogix 5580 Process), \u043e\u0442 36.011 \u0434\u043e 36.011 (ControlLogix 5580 Process), \u043e\u0442 31.011 \u0434\u043e 33.017 (GuardLogix 5580), \u043e\u0442 34.011 \u0434\u043e 34.014 (GuardLogix 5580), \u043e\u0442 36.011 \u0434\u043e 36.011 (GuardLogix 5580), \u043e\u0442 28.011 \u0434\u043e 33.017 (CompactLogix 5380), \u043e\u0442 34.011 \u0434\u043e 34.014 (CompactLogix 5380), \u043e\u0442 36.011 \u0434\u043e 36.011 (CompactLogix 5380), \u043e\u0442 31.011 \u0434\u043e 33.017 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2), \u043e\u0442 34.011 \u0434\u043e 34.014 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2), \u043e\u0442 35.011 \u0434\u043e 35.013 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2), \u043e\u0442 36.011 \u0434\u043e 36.011 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2), \u043e\u0442 32.013 \u0434\u043e 33.017 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3), \u043e\u0442 34.011 \u0434\u043e 34.014 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3), \u043e\u0442 35.011 \u0434\u043e 35.013 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3), \u043e\u0442 36.011 \u0434\u043e 36.011 (Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3), \u043e\u0442 32.011 \u0434\u043e 33.017 (CompactLogix 5480), \u043e\u0442 34.011 \u0434\u043e 34.014 (CompactLogix 5480), \u043e\u0442 36.011 \u0434\u043e 36.011 (CompactLogix 5480), \u043e\u0442 33.011 \u0434\u043e 33.017 (FactoryTalk Logix Echo), \u043e\u0442 34.011 \u0434\u043e 34.014 (FactoryTalk Logix Echo), \u043e\u0442 35.011 \u0434\u043e 35.013 (FactoryTalk Logix Echo), \u043e\u0442 36.011 \u0434\u043e 36.011 (FactoryTalk Logix Echo)",
  "\u0412\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0440\u044b \u043f\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e": "\u0418\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f:\nhttps://www.rockwellautomation.com/en-us/trust-center/security-advisories/advisory.SD1707.html",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0432\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "10.10.2024",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "30.10.2024",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "30.10.2024",
  "\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440": "BDU:2024-08751",
  "\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c \u043e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "CVE-2024-6207",
  "\u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430",
  "\u041a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430",
  "\u041d\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041f\u041e": "ControlLogix 5580, GuardLogix 5580, CompactLogix 5380, CompactLogix 5480, ControlLogix 5580 Process, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3, FactoryTalk Logix Echo",
  "\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041e\u0421 \u0438 \u0442\u0438\u043f \u0430\u043f\u043f\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u044b": null,
  "\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430 CIP Message Handler \u043c\u0438\u043a\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u043c\u044b\u0445 \u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u043e\u043b\u043b\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0432 Rockwell Automation ControlLogix 5580, CompactLogix 5380, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3, CompactLogix 5480, FactoryTalk Logix Echo, \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e \u0432\u044b\u0437\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0430\u0437 \u0432 \u043e\u0431\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438",
  "\u041d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0438\u0435 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0430": "\u0414\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f",
  "\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "\u041d\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0430 \u0432\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u043c\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 (CWE-20)",
  "\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430 CIP Message Handler \u043c\u0438\u043a\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u0438\u0440\u0443\u0435\u043c\u044b\u0445 \u043b\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u043e\u043b\u043b\u0435\u0440\u043e\u0432 Rockwell Automation ControlLogix 5580, CompactLogix 5380, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 2, Compact GuardLogix 5380 SIL 3, CompactLogix 5480, FactoryTalk Logix Echo \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0441 \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0442\u043a\u0435 \u0432\u0445\u043e\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0442 \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e, \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0435\u043c\u0443 \u0443\u0434\u0430\u043b\u0451\u043d\u043d\u043e, \u0432\u044b\u0437\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0430\u0437 \u0432 \u043e\u0431\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438",
  "\u041f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": null,
  "\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0430\u044f \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f": null,
  "\u0421\u0432\u044f\u0437\u044c \u0441 \u0438\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0418\u0411": "\u0414\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f",
  "\u0421\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0430",
  "\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "\u041e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f",
  "\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "\u041c\u0430\u043d\u0438\u043f\u0443\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0440\u0441\u0430\u043c\u0438",
  "\u0421\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6207\nhttps://vuldb.com/?id.280325\nhttps://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2024-6207\nhttps://www.rockwellautomation.com/en-us/trust-center/security-advisories/advisory.SD1707.html",
  "\u0421\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041f\u043e\u0434\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043c",
  "\u0422\u0438\u043f \u041f\u041e": "\u041c\u0438\u043a\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u0434, \u0421\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0410\u0421\u0423 \u0422\u041f, \u041f\u041e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e-\u0430\u043f\u043f\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0410\u0421\u0423 \u0422\u041f, \u041f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0441\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0410\u0421\u0423 \u0422\u041f",
  "\u0422\u0438\u043f \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "CWE-20",
  "\u0423\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0412\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 2.0 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 7,8)\n\u0412\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 3.0 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 7,5)"
}



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  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

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How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

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    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.