MAL-2026-5906
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (26567b08d635c9b26d6befaba3dfc61a957bcf295cb321d03025b39bc54890ad)
Package republishes the chai source tree under the confusable name chai-plugin-kit. The package's main entry (index.js) spawns a detached, stdio-silenced node subprocess running lib/chai/utils/addAssertion.js on every require('chai-plugin-kit'). That file is heavily obfuscated with obfuscator.io transforms (rotated 31-entry string array _0x4a30, custom base64 decoder _0x495d, hex-named identifiers, control-flow flattening) hiding an https GET to an attacker-controlled URL whose response body is passed to new Function('require', body) and immediately invoked with the real require — granting attacker-controlled JavaScript full Node API access (filesystem, network, child_process, env). The detached + unref + stdio:'ignore' pattern is deliberate evasion to hide the child process from the consuming developer. A legitimate chai plugin has no reason to fetch and eval remote code.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "e045f0b4ff409bcc00b1c2e74f687501740197295b26b41587f94c7d2f39c3d3",
"tlsh": "19f0dcfa02c1aa286d31bbf18007442623e3c172f24040a8fafd90d26657b835233cbd"
},
{
"path": "lib/chai/utils/addAssertion.js",
"sha256": "961b2fbc992308f4161585b983b21aad70e6e352f089b22cf1534add58e73f53",
"tlsh": "5181fd9552842ac0a69feeff3b0370e4d06659567e8605eab800bd64fdc2728d7c6b70"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "chai-plugin-kit-5.8.1.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "4b1dbd25581c5c15bbfd7c7f41706c47aefbedaf",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-wYUFBdc4wZxvHBbB8rxrdQz3NC/h1Ol2S1SaZ/BYyvPrJR9EbRqXQWCIfL5jeKKH/yOLH54KN0umfOXPfqsbGw=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "chai-plugin-kit"
},
"versions": [
"5.8.1"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-006790",
"import_time": "2026-06-16T18:10:20.51964844Z",
"modified_time": "2026-06-16T16:22:48Z",
"sha256": "26567b08d635c9b26d6befaba3dfc61a957bcf295cb321d03025b39bc54890ad",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"5.8.1"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (26567b08d635c9b26d6befaba3dfc61a957bcf295cb321d03025b39bc54890ad)\nPackage republishes the chai source tree under the confusable name `chai-plugin-kit`. The package\u0027s main entry (`index.js`) spawns a detached, stdio-silenced `node` subprocess running `lib/chai/utils/addAssertion.js` on every `require(\u0027chai-plugin-kit\u0027)`. That file is heavily obfuscated with obfuscator.io transforms (rotated 31-entry string array `_0x4a30`, custom base64 decoder `_0x495d`, hex-named identifiers, control-flow flattening) hiding an https GET to an attacker-controlled URL whose response body is passed to `new Function(\u0027require\u0027, body)` and immediately invoked with the real `require` \u2014 granting attacker-controlled JavaScript full Node API access (filesystem, network, child_process, env). The detached + unref + `stdio:\u0027ignore\u0027` pattern is deliberate evasion to hide the child process from the consuming developer. A legitimate chai plugin has no reason to fetch and eval remote code.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-5906",
"modified": "2026-06-16T16:22:48Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T16:22:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/chai-plugin-kit/v/5.8.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in chai-plugin-kit (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.