MAL-2026-5899
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (05bd1dbc9732ef80aca27acad964c041b74e646e26cf4947ad34807c41d2c4a8)
Package name 'stripe-cli-init-plugin' impersonates the Stripe CLI ecosystem and ships a bin script (bin/run.js) that, when invoked via npx stripe-cli-init-plugin or as the installed CLI, POSTs the installer's project directory basename and a timestamp to a hardcoded remote URL (https://deepbounty.dd06-dev.fr/cb/10306845-ff21-4176-8574-95dd4917bc45). The package self-describes as a 'Security PoC for Bug Bounty' but is published to the public npm registry under a name designed to be reached via typo or autocomplete confusion against the legitimate Stripe CLI tooling, and provides no advertised functionality — its only effect on the installer is to confirm execution and leak the CWD basename to the author's server. The combination of name-confusion targeting a top-tier brand plus a silent phone-home to an attacker-controlled endpoint constitutes a supply-chain attack regardless of the author's stated intent.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "bin/run.js",
"sha256": "211d2ed66357fe273894cd0a18a72a8fc068aae09df1bc9dcbdbc06b6814a35a",
"tlsh": "8d2154916ad2673412e61ad0995b9d0b732bb50b7e46f498b5dc01881fc813c9573fce"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "c45a9383d0dbc69b14ffc97af3d3efc2df19e5fea61bbc87e5ddc740a4d6bd85",
"tlsh": "72d0120c459ab4037a92cafc196e51c0922d076e341ac81908a83424d0eb7faa23a786"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "stripe-cli-init-plugin-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "3e2e2d246f7875401e80b6a1ccdbe729ce10e5c7",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-+nSYt9gL08bItWlwBqeVgjSLmOzgb6nQeKUj7Ph110+6IQP02Yex5y845X9HAy7BTV1whEMIIN6SXLFMM8EXLQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "stripe-cli-init-plugin"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-006754",
"import_time": "2026-06-16T16:06:33.294737958Z",
"modified_time": "2026-06-16T15:20:11Z",
"sha256": "05bd1dbc9732ef80aca27acad964c041b74e646e26cf4947ad34807c41d2c4a8",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (05bd1dbc9732ef80aca27acad964c041b74e646e26cf4947ad34807c41d2c4a8)\nPackage name \u0027stripe-cli-init-plugin\u0027 impersonates the Stripe CLI ecosystem and ships a bin script (bin/run.js) that, when invoked via `npx stripe-cli-init-plugin` or as the installed CLI, POSTs the installer\u0027s project directory basename and a timestamp to a hardcoded remote URL (https://deepbounty.dd06-dev.fr/cb/10306845-ff21-4176-8574-95dd4917bc45). The package self-describes as a \u0027Security PoC for Bug Bounty\u0027 but is published to the public npm registry under a name designed to be reached via typo or autocomplete confusion against the legitimate Stripe CLI tooling, and provides no advertised functionality \u2014 its only effect on the installer is to confirm execution and leak the CWD basename to the author\u0027s server. The combination of name-confusion targeting a top-tier brand plus a silent phone-home to an attacker-controlled endpoint constitutes a supply-chain attack regardless of the author\u0027s stated intent.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-5899",
"modified": "2026-06-16T15:20:11Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T15:20:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/stripe-cli-init-plugin/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in stripe-cli-init-plugin (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.