MAL-2026-4780
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (1f1f950e58a5bfe1df7c6507fe6ae8edd75ececaca6456efe57e24ab143cf7f7)
On startup, plugmem_mcp.mjs writes /.reasonix/settings.json registering PostToolUse and UserPromptSubmit hooks that execute scripts/memory_manager.py (also copied into the project). When triggered (auto-flush every 5 tool calls), memory_manager.py reads the apiKey from ~/.reasonix/config.json and POSTs it as a Bearer token together with summaries of the user's tool-call observations (file paths, command outputs) and prompts to https://api.deepseek.com/v1/chat/completions. The destination is hardcoded and not disclosed in the README; the user is not given an opportunity to choose or be informed of the third-party LLM provider receiving their data and credentials. This is the silent-relay shape: normal use of the advertised MCP API silently exfiltrates caller-supplied data and the locally stored API key to a third-party endpoint chosen by the package author.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "scripts/memory_manager.py",
"sha256": "779474bb9604b53a3f1eff596620ab65a7155271d7b95262a946162b4f28028f",
"tlsh": "fa929435d82f581777a3e16d6946a401b324b4433545293cbe8cb6ac2fee436e2b637c"
},
{
"path": "plugmem_mcp.mjs",
"sha256": "b42f7c047d954c6b418aa76ba622394619343978f200b7f68de4a5f79b371882",
"tlsh": "98e2fa96e1fdf2391d56d0b03a435015f6b89245b2c4dcb8f25ce2b06f668f482ba76c"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "reasonix-plugmem-3.1.4.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "5696ecf86581b2547b59000e4ec0dabdb5d16097",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-SCjwCPt8clvUK1RYzoGi/bJyMZd/o/mzDnc9UVEiVzIreQvcIsV96Gom4PMOHRfuXycUW0RELjKjd5JJlTuC7Q=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "reasonix-plugmem"
},
"versions": [
"3.1.4"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"actran@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-004850",
"import_time": "2026-05-26T06:26:14.045959015Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-26T06:23:50Z",
"sha256": "1f1f950e58a5bfe1df7c6507fe6ae8edd75ececaca6456efe57e24ab143cf7f7",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"3.1.4"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1f1f950e58a5bfe1df7c6507fe6ae8edd75ececaca6456efe57e24ab143cf7f7)\nOn startup, plugmem_mcp.mjs writes \u003ccwd\u003e/.reasonix/settings.json registering PostToolUse and UserPromptSubmit hooks that execute scripts/memory_manager.py (also copied into the project). When triggered (auto-flush every 5 tool calls), memory_manager.py reads the `apiKey` from ~/.reasonix/config.json and POSTs it as a Bearer token together with summaries of the user\u0027s tool-call observations (file paths, command outputs) and prompts to https://api.deepseek.com/v1/chat/completions. The destination is hardcoded and not disclosed in the README; the user is not given an opportunity to choose or be informed of the third-party LLM provider receiving their data and credentials. This is the silent-relay shape: normal use of the advertised MCP API silently exfiltrates caller-supplied data and the locally stored API key to a third-party endpoint chosen by the package author.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-4780",
"modified": "2026-05-26T06:23:50Z",
"published": "2026-05-26T06:23:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/reasonix-plugmem/v/3.1.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in reasonix-plugmem (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.