MAL-2026-19942
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages – Published: 2026-11-15 08:33 – Updated: 2026-11-16 22:37 – Source website| Ecosystem | Package | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| PyPI |
gatepay-sdk-python
|
99.99.1
|
The sdist's setup.py executes on pip install and performs a DNS lookup of a subdomain constructed from an MD5 hash of the installer's hostname under the attacker-controlled parent zone gatepay-sdk-python.depconf.zsdsh.xyz. The lookup fires unconditionally during install, with no user interaction, exfiltrating a per-host identifier to whoever operates that DNS zone and enabling enumeration of every environment where the package resolves. The version number (99.99.1) and name shape are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal package. The README's claim that no data is exfiltrated contradicts the observed behavior.
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
-
The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
-
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
| Type | Indicator | Hashes |
|---|---|---|
| Evidence file |
setup.py
|
sha256
a892ccce5ea9f8f9c29f25df760671b5d524adaa8d5bf07663aef8ed91bece97tlsh
a0f0e705ce15946550fc4158487f96143530a3437f03e49b675a47417f8f1dfc336764 |
| Package archive |
gatepay_sdk_python-99.99.1.tar.gz
|
blake2b_256
914de1fa0049d907ce2a5f2b0519cf4c0dce4431d37c614233e4174a1252bcc9md5
a82bc03e22a92d40eaa532946b3e6822sha256
a6093f5c4caa1171091eaeef15eafaa68e5f5951e42b88c4fe291627f6bcd2c4 |
- CWE-506 - Embedded Malicious Code
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"artifacts": [
"gatepay_sdk_python-99.99.1.tar.gz"
],
"path": "setup.py",
"sha256": "a892ccce5ea9f8f9c29f25df760671b5d524adaa8d5bf07663aef8ed91bece97",
"tlsh": "a0f0e705ce15946550fc4158487f96143530a3437f03e49b675a47417f8f1dfc336764"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "gatepay_sdk_python-99.99.1.tar.gz",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "914de1fa0049d907ce2a5f2b0519cf4c0dce4431d37c614233e4174a1252bcc9",
"md5": "a82bc03e22a92d40eaa532946b3e6822",
"sha256": "a6093f5c4caa1171091eaeef15eafaa68e5f5951e42b88c4fe291627f6bcd2c4"
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "gatepay-sdk-python"
},
"versions": [
"99.99.1"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "REPORTER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "pypi/GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest/gatepay-sdk-python",
"import_time": "2026-11-15T09:11:42.877340442Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-15T08:33:20.128852Z",
"sha256": "9ea41e6fdee5681e8ec43463b12b4893e323c02cec35e358489fa98443154713",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"99.99.1"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022812",
"import_time": "2026-11-16T22:36:32.152176643Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-16T22:27:25Z",
"sha256": "2d538d791bd87fe8c0058441c9acd724ceecbf5ab0ae3afb16f76a886bde3517",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"99.99.1"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (2d538d791bd87fe8c0058441c9acd724ceecbf5ab0ae3afb16f76a886bde3517)\nThe sdist\u0027s setup.py executes on `pip install` and performs a DNS lookup of a subdomain constructed from an MD5 hash of the installer\u0027s hostname under the attacker-controlled parent zone `gatepay-sdk-python.depconf.zsdsh.xyz`. The lookup fires unconditionally during install, with no user interaction, exfiltrating a per-host identifier to whoever operates that DNS zone and enabling enumeration of every environment where the package resolves. The version number (99.99.1) and name shape are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal package. The README\u0027s claim that no data is exfiltrated contradicts the observed behavior.\n\n## Source: kam193 (9ea41e6fdee5681e8ec43463b12b4893e323c02cec35e358489fa98443154713)\nInstalling the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research \u0026 co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.\n\n\nCampaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.\n\n\n - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-19942",
"modified": "2026-11-16T22:37:51.807902010Z",
"published": "2026-11-15T08:33:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/gatepay-sdk-python"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/gatepay-sdk-python/99.99.1/"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in gatepay-sdk-python (PyPI)"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.