MAL-2026-18636 (GHSA-CFR8-88WX-3J9G)
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages – Published: 2026-11-04 18:01 – Updated: 2026-11-13 03:37 – Source website| Ecosystem | Package | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| npm |
kvarzo-8f3a2-testmetest
|
Affected: All versions (semver)
1.0.1
|
kvarzo-8f3a2-testmetest@1.0.1 ships as a 'test package' whose index.js has no exported API: on require() it platform-dispatches to one of three bundled native N-API addons (native.napi.node, native_mac.node, native_win.node) inside a try/catch and prints 'hello'. The native addons read a shipped 1.3MB opaque.napi_cache blob, decrypt it, write the decrypted payload to /tmp/. on POSIX (via fork + setsid + execlp) or %TEMP%...nc.js on Windows (via CreateProcessA with SetFileAttributesA to hide the file), and execute it detached. The payload content is non-auditable from source and runs on every import of the package. The native code additionally enumerates CI environment variables (GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, CIRCLECI, JENKINS_URL, BUILDKITE, CODEBUILD_BUILD_ID, APPVEYOR, SEMAPHORE, TEAMCITY_VERSION, BITBUCKET_BUILD_NUMBER, NOW_GITHUB_DEPLOYMENT, CF_BUILD_ID, SCREWDRIVER), inspects /proc/1/cgroup, /proc/self/status TracerPid, /proc/self/maps and /proc/1/cmdline, and on Windows calls IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent, and Process32First/Next scanning for 'wireshark' and 'httpdebug' to suppress behavior in analysis environments. The combination of an encrypted dropper, hidden-file execution, environment evasion, and a placeholder library surface gives the author arbitrary code execution on any machine that installs and loads the package.
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
| Type | Indicator | Hashes |
|---|---|---|
| Evidence file |
native.napi.node
|
sha256
c2caf5d3ae8b7f69493754cb5b50a9c80aa483efec18ae8191aec633a97a7690tlsh
ef72854bd2a0ed3ec4d86235598b527253a2d070ef30172f0f54a2fb2d973586e7ae52 |
| Evidence file |
index.js
|
sha256
f6fa35d3f8c5bb6f269ba47e8b02efbcbe286baa7d0f102438a446dfb35c73fbtlsh
f2c0c0c837d8402c3a7403d410f803012083c900448c174e4ec9a1330ec0cc05f04c77 |
- CWE-506 - Embedded Malicious Code
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cfr8-88wx-3j9g | ADVISORY |
| https://www.npmjs.com/package/kvarzo-8f3a2-testme… | PACKAGE |
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "native.napi.node",
"sha256": "c2caf5d3ae8b7f69493754cb5b50a9c80aa483efec18ae8191aec633a97a7690",
"tlsh": "ef72854bd2a0ed3ec4d86235598b527253a2d070ef30172f0f54a2fb2d973586e7ae52"
},
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "f6fa35d3f8c5bb6f269ba47e8b02efbcbe286baa7d0f102438a446dfb35c73fb",
"tlsh": "f2c0c0c837d8402c3a7403d410f803012083c900448c174e4ec9a1330ec0cc05f04c77"
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "kvarzo-8f3a2-testmetest"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.0.1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-cfr8-88wx-3j9g"
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "GHSA-cfr8-88wx-3j9g",
"import_time": "2026-11-04T18:20:09.211345824Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-04T18:02:25Z",
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"sha256": "585289d80a705650a586dbdc453c0d5a6ed2399a338bf1309dfff7e41a804472",
"source": "ghsa-malware"
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-022713",
"import_time": "2026-11-13T03:36:36.251243688Z",
"modified_time": "2026-11-13T03:36:00Z",
"sha256": "7901219714947e0995a049f9c26620fa8586f9c41bff2c3ed141168f008c0bae",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.1"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (7901219714947e0995a049f9c26620fa8586f9c41bff2c3ed141168f008c0bae)\nkvarzo-8f3a2-testmetest@1.0.1 ships as a \u0027test package\u0027 whose index.js has no exported API: on require() it platform-dispatches to one of three bundled native N-API addons (native.napi.node, native_mac.node, native_win.node) inside a try/catch and prints \u0027hello\u0027. The native addons read a shipped 1.3MB opaque.napi_cache blob, decrypt it, write the decrypted payload to /tmp/.\u003cpid\u003e on POSIX (via fork + setsid + execlp) or %TEMP%\\...nc\u003cpid\u003e.js on Windows (via CreateProcessA with SetFileAttributesA to hide the file), and execute it detached. The payload content is non-auditable from source and runs on every import of the package. The native code additionally enumerates CI environment variables (GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, CIRCLECI, JENKINS_URL, BUILDKITE, CODEBUILD_BUILD_ID, APPVEYOR, SEMAPHORE, TEAMCITY_VERSION, BITBUCKET_BUILD_NUMBER, NOW_GITHUB_DEPLOYMENT, CF_BUILD_ID, SCREWDRIVER), inspects /proc/1/cgroup, /proc/self/status TracerPid, /proc/self/maps and /proc/1/cmdline, and on Windows calls IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent, and Process32First/Next scanning for \u0027wireshark\u0027 and \u0027httpdebug\u0027 to suppress behavior in analysis environments. The combination of an encrypted dropper, hidden-file execution, environment evasion, and a placeholder library surface gives the author arbitrary code execution on any machine that installs and loads the package.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (585289d80a705650a586dbdc453c0d5a6ed2399a338bf1309dfff7e41a804472)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-18636",
"modified": "2026-11-13T03:37:49.368481407Z",
"published": "2026-11-04T18:01:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cfr8-88wx-3j9g"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/kvarzo-8f3a2-testmetest/v/1.0.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in kvarzo-8f3a2-testmetest (npm)"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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