MAL-2026-17808
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (e89449bafb4f816bd8605f45cedf0fec8ec0cff9088007a7a38aaea0a9db91ec)
On npm install, postinstall.js automatically collects installer-side identifying data — hostname, username, home directory, non-internal network interface addresses, DNS servers, current working directory, install directory, and the value of npm_config_registry (which discloses the installer's internal/private npm registry URL) — and POSTs it as JSON over HTTPS to the hardcoded author endpoint collector.oob.s4yhii.com at path /_npm-poc/beacon. In parallel, the script performs a DNS lookup against a unique per-run subdomain under oob.s4yhii.com (dns.lookup of .db03o8lag74hsugsg2j091t8mfcf437h3.oob.s4yhii.com), providing an out-of-band DNS confirmation channel that works even when outbound HTTPS is blocked. The dual-channel beacon, the capture of internal registry configuration, and the fully automated install-time trigger match the fingerprint of a dependency-confusion probe. The package's self-description as a proof-of-concept does not change the behavior: installer-side host and internal-infrastructure data leaves the host to an attacker-controlled destination without opt-in.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "postinstall.js",
"sha256": "4e1c182ebf45e34a28a3e7b757eb8442d3b307372dbbc0d2b50898c03fb738d6",
"tlsh": "1871a56619b4063227e52ee169862094972ac767791cbae0721e13485fce1be40f13ff"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "r2-https-b-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "8a275bc95b24a3acaa524dcad29bc9007355fc19",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-4awAT4uqWnfreXIQ2dwlO2rNOz66od0hf1qIosFZYyqaM1NoUZXnIhHnKZQedq5+aXdUJCwjiqiTqrnsbSO6qw=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@s4yhiitestpoc/r2-https-b"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-021460",
"import_time": "2026-10-12T05:29:25.256040939Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-12T05:27:26Z",
"sha256": "e89449bafb4f816bd8605f45cedf0fec8ec0cff9088007a7a38aaea0a9db91ec",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e89449bafb4f816bd8605f45cedf0fec8ec0cff9088007a7a38aaea0a9db91ec)\nOn npm install, postinstall.js automatically collects installer-side identifying data \u2014 hostname, username, home directory, non-internal network interface addresses, DNS servers, current working directory, install directory, and the value of npm_config_registry (which discloses the installer\u0027s internal/private npm registry URL) \u2014 and POSTs it as JSON over HTTPS to the hardcoded author endpoint collector.oob.s4yhii.com at path /_npm-poc/beacon. In parallel, the script performs a DNS lookup against a unique per-run subdomain under oob.s4yhii.com (dns.lookup of \u003clabel\u003e.db03o8lag74hsugsg2j091t8mfcf437h3.oob.s4yhii.com), providing an out-of-band DNS confirmation channel that works even when outbound HTTPS is blocked. The dual-channel beacon, the capture of internal registry configuration, and the fully automated install-time trigger match the fingerprint of a dependency-confusion probe. The package\u0027s self-description as a proof-of-concept does not change the behavior: installer-side host and internal-infrastructure data leaves the host to an attacker-controlled destination without opt-in.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17808",
"modified": "2026-10-12T05:27:26Z",
"published": "2026-10-12T05:27:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@s4yhiitestpoc/r2-https-b/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @s4yhiitestpoc/r2-https-b (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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