MAL-2026-17469
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (97f8f2854fc15ef2f2a5d4c44b050aa9f3c87a7f5a832949390cf22ccd7882a6)
The package's public API harness.run(edge=) downloads two sha256-pinned gzipped native binaries ('inference-core.bin.gz' and 'edge-conn.bin.gz') from https:///files/, chmods them 0755, and spawns them on the installer's host. The caller-supplied edge argument chooses only the delivery CDN; the binary contents are fixed by the author via the pinned hashes. The surrounding Python code emits a synthetic, deterministic progress trace (fabricated step/loss/tok-s lines) rather than real benchmark data, so the advertised 'evaluation harness' purpose does not match the behavior of the fetched code. The JSON configuration passed to the 'inference-core' binary — pools:[{url,user,pass:'vox',keepalive,tls}], cpu:{enabled,threads,mem-locked}, cache-budget, log-period, autosave — matches the xmrig-family mining-pool client schema rather than any inference or benchmarking worker schema, and the second binary (~19MB) is invoked as 'access tcp --hostname --url 127.0.0.1:', the Cloudflare cloudflared access-tunnel CLI shape used to reach a pool endpoint behind a tunnel. A _hb() routine additionally POSTs run id, state, and up to 4000 characters of exception traceback to https:///hb as an operator heartbeat/control-plane check-in. Installing and invoking the harness causes the installer's machine to execute author-controlled native code and donate CPU to an operator-controlled mining pool under a fake benchmarking cover story.
Source: kam193 (4abc7154004498e9054ca8ac239acd73ab86815f6029ad5d52e4c883488f4c70)
The package imitates real activity and instead deploys a coin miner.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-10-voxeval
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- cryptominer
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "infrabench/__init__.py",
"sha256": "5296464c4c5a7b7df410d3d90460491d1e4156d679057b84fe60b1e56e91c099",
"tlsh": "a61251f298161932c303ca5e4966e953a74e6c47ab0e6834b9fc93142fa5670c1f0fe6"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "infrabench-0.2.0-py3-none-any.whl",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "6af9c25edfe16a163806e4e42728db6001715a7be89f0936b9207a9ce1baf9a4",
"md5": "ca3627a2994f5002a4fd1b1716df9bcc",
"sha256": "e040e5c3a577a21b3c209f36d132e997752dde6726fe39d9b5945c2796bcf901"
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "infrabench"
},
"versions": [
"0.1.0",
"0.1.1",
"0.2.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "REPORTER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "pypi/2026-10-voxeval/infrabench",
"import_time": "2026-10-03T16:51:40.851501825Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-03T16:21:40.309872Z",
"sha256": "4abc7154004498e9054ca8ac239acd73ab86815f6029ad5d52e4c883488f4c70",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"0.1.0",
"0.1.1",
"0.2.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020939",
"import_time": "2026-10-04T23:40:44.043292362Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-04T23:23:01Z",
"sha256": "36dc0d39f8c45a9ebf4056b41ea346558e881f6fd826918a15c549e1754d9f36",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.2.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020941",
"import_time": "2026-10-04T23:40:44.260479758Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-04T23:23:23Z",
"sha256": "71be58141faa0a9b081cc862370df995831d0869b8a9b3a82658752d2406aa96",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.1.1"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020945",
"import_time": "2026-10-04T23:40:44.69339598Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-04T23:24:01Z",
"sha256": "97f8f2854fc15ef2f2a5d4c44b050aa9f3c87a7f5a832949390cf22ccd7882a6",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (97f8f2854fc15ef2f2a5d4c44b050aa9f3c87a7f5a832949390cf22ccd7882a6)\nThe package\u0027s public API harness.run(edge=\u003chost\u003e) downloads two sha256-pinned gzipped native binaries (\u0027inference-core.bin.gz\u0027 and \u0027edge-conn.bin.gz\u0027) from https://\u003cedge\u003e/files/, chmods them 0755, and spawns them on the installer\u0027s host. The caller-supplied edge argument chooses only the delivery CDN; the binary contents are fixed by the author via the pinned hashes. The surrounding Python code emits a synthetic, deterministic progress trace (fabricated step/loss/tok-s lines) rather than real benchmark data, so the advertised \u0027evaluation harness\u0027 purpose does not match the behavior of the fetched code. The JSON configuration passed to the \u0027inference-core\u0027 binary \u2014 pools:[{url,user,pass:\u0027vox\u0027,keepalive,tls}], cpu:{enabled,threads,mem-locked}, cache-budget, log-period, autosave \u2014 matches the xmrig-family mining-pool client schema rather than any inference or benchmarking worker schema, and the second binary (~19MB) is invoked as \u0027access tcp --hostname \u003chost\u003e --url 127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e\u0027, the Cloudflare cloudflared access-tunnel CLI shape used to reach a pool endpoint behind a tunnel. A _hb() routine additionally POSTs run id, state, and up to 4000 characters of exception traceback to https://\u003cedge\u003e/hb as an operator heartbeat/control-plane check-in. Installing and invoking the harness causes the installer\u0027s machine to execute author-controlled native code and donate CPU to an operator-controlled mining pool under a fake benchmarking cover story.\n\n## Source: kam193 (4abc7154004498e9054ca8ac239acd73ab86815f6029ad5d52e4c883488f4c70)\nThe package imitates real activity and instead deploys a coin miner.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-10-voxeval\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - cryptominer\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17469",
"modified": "2026-10-04T23:42:41.437882760Z",
"published": "2026-10-03T16:21:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/infrabench"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/infrabench/0.2.0/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/infrabench/0.1.1/"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/infrabench/0.1.0/"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in infrabench (PyPI)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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