MAL-2026-16473
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-09-23 09:07
Modified
2026-09-23 09:07
Summary
Malicious code in sea-baileys (npm)
Details

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (2aaf4b5ddb859270a86aa6d21df680ed66fb0622434317747a6f7275ad9a3d60)

sea-baileys is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. Its package.json remaps the libsignal import specifier to npm:@otaxayun/libsignal-node@latest — an unrelated maintainer's package pinned to the mutable latest dist-tag rather than a fixed version or integrity hash. lib/Signal/libsignal.js routes the installer's Signal Protocol identity private key, signed pre-key private key, session records and sender keys through this dependency, so whatever code @otaxayun/libsignal-node resolves to at install time handles the consumer's WhatsApp cryptographic identity and message stream. Because the tag is mutable and owned by a third party outside the sea-baileys publisher, a single publish under that name replaces the crypto implementation on every subsequent npm install. Separately, lib/Utils/messages-media.js's prepareWAMessageMedia unconditionally attaches a hardcoded annotations block referencing the newsletter JID 120363409928671192@newsletter ("HOSHINO AI INFORMATION") to every outgoing media message when the caller does not supply annotations, silently modifying consumer-generated WhatsApp payloads to advertise the fork author's channel.

CWE
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "cwes": [
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          }
        ],
        "indicators": {
          "evidence_files": [
            {
              "path": "package.json",
              "sha256": "79f563fb480dea671b0fd4db872c30e71685ce8728879e59f39ef695c9af8a1c",
              "tlsh": "9b51da25cc2cceb314c626eaa9ba0101507841a34d95fc1c376c0bad4f5e2af31b9b7e"
            },
            {
              "path": "lib/Utils/messages.js",
              "sha256": "875a52973d9ed9e5d01758930d29e9bb134731ee9df69d9520c651739ca2beb7",
              "tlsh": "8303835899f70c2e065ba096f75b7060b234d4076208fa22facc83d56fc95a89bf37d5"
            }
          ],
          "package_integrity": [
            {
              "filename": "sea-baileys-1.0.2.tgz",
              "hashes": {
                "sha1": "d56c3207036eaf99417b24f7596549b47158781e",
                "sha512_sri": "sha512-2CxPsgowrkbdLYDPJoAI6W7a+i0HyNe2zglPtBOxbIykOoPEXPmMt65OFlQwONby6EzWeN5SD72jx1de+o05xQ=="
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "sea-baileys"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1.0.2"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "inspector-research@amazon.com"
      ],
      "name": "Amazon Inspector",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-020484",
        "import_time": "2026-09-23T09:20:27.731672478Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-09-23T09:07:47Z",
        "sha256": "2aaf4b5ddb859270a86aa6d21df680ed66fb0622434317747a6f7275ad9a3d60",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.0.2"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (2aaf4b5ddb859270a86aa6d21df680ed66fb0622434317747a6f7275ad9a3d60)\nsea-baileys is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. Its package.json remaps the `libsignal` import specifier to `npm:@otaxayun/libsignal-node@latest` \u2014 an unrelated maintainer\u0027s package pinned to the mutable `latest` dist-tag rather than a fixed version or integrity hash. lib/Signal/libsignal.js routes the installer\u0027s Signal Protocol identity private key, signed pre-key private key, session records and sender keys through this dependency, so whatever code `@otaxayun/libsignal-node` resolves to at install time handles the consumer\u0027s WhatsApp cryptographic identity and message stream. Because the tag is mutable and owned by a third party outside the sea-baileys publisher, a single publish under that name replaces the crypto implementation on every subsequent `npm install`. Separately, lib/Utils/messages-media.js\u0027s prepareWAMessageMedia unconditionally attaches a hardcoded `annotations` block referencing the newsletter JID `120363409928671192@newsletter` (\"HOSHINO AI INFORMATION\") to every outgoing media message when the caller does not supply annotations, silently modifying consumer-generated WhatsApp payloads to advertise the fork author\u0027s channel.\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-16473",
  "modified": "2026-09-23T09:07:47Z",
  "published": "2026-09-23T09:07:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/sea-baileys/v/1.0.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in sea-baileys (npm)"
}



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