MAL-2026-16473
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (2aaf4b5ddb859270a86aa6d21df680ed66fb0622434317747a6f7275ad9a3d60)
sea-baileys is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. Its package.json remaps the libsignal import specifier to npm:@otaxayun/libsignal-node@latest — an unrelated maintainer's package pinned to the mutable latest dist-tag rather than a fixed version or integrity hash. lib/Signal/libsignal.js routes the installer's Signal Protocol identity private key, signed pre-key private key, session records and sender keys through this dependency, so whatever code @otaxayun/libsignal-node resolves to at install time handles the consumer's WhatsApp cryptographic identity and message stream. Because the tag is mutable and owned by a third party outside the sea-baileys publisher, a single publish under that name replaces the crypto implementation on every subsequent npm install. Separately, lib/Utils/messages-media.js's prepareWAMessageMedia unconditionally attaches a hardcoded annotations block referencing the newsletter JID 120363409928671192@newsletter ("HOSHINO AI INFORMATION") to every outgoing media message when the caller does not supply annotations, silently modifying consumer-generated WhatsApp payloads to advertise the fork author's channel.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "79f563fb480dea671b0fd4db872c30e71685ce8728879e59f39ef695c9af8a1c",
"tlsh": "9b51da25cc2cceb314c626eaa9ba0101507841a34d95fc1c376c0bad4f5e2af31b9b7e"
},
{
"path": "lib/Utils/messages.js",
"sha256": "875a52973d9ed9e5d01758930d29e9bb134731ee9df69d9520c651739ca2beb7",
"tlsh": "8303835899f70c2e065ba096f75b7060b234d4076208fa22facc83d56fc95a89bf37d5"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "sea-baileys-1.0.2.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "d56c3207036eaf99417b24f7596549b47158781e",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-2CxPsgowrkbdLYDPJoAI6W7a+i0HyNe2zglPtBOxbIykOoPEXPmMt65OFlQwONby6EzWeN5SD72jx1de+o05xQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "sea-baileys"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.2"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020484",
"import_time": "2026-09-23T09:20:27.731672478Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-23T09:07:47Z",
"sha256": "2aaf4b5ddb859270a86aa6d21df680ed66fb0622434317747a6f7275ad9a3d60",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.2"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (2aaf4b5ddb859270a86aa6d21df680ed66fb0622434317747a6f7275ad9a3d60)\nsea-baileys is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library. Its package.json remaps the `libsignal` import specifier to `npm:@otaxayun/libsignal-node@latest` \u2014 an unrelated maintainer\u0027s package pinned to the mutable `latest` dist-tag rather than a fixed version or integrity hash. lib/Signal/libsignal.js routes the installer\u0027s Signal Protocol identity private key, signed pre-key private key, session records and sender keys through this dependency, so whatever code `@otaxayun/libsignal-node` resolves to at install time handles the consumer\u0027s WhatsApp cryptographic identity and message stream. Because the tag is mutable and owned by a third party outside the sea-baileys publisher, a single publish under that name replaces the crypto implementation on every subsequent `npm install`. Separately, lib/Utils/messages-media.js\u0027s prepareWAMessageMedia unconditionally attaches a hardcoded `annotations` block referencing the newsletter JID `120363409928671192@newsletter` (\"HOSHINO AI INFORMATION\") to every outgoing media message when the caller does not supply annotations, silently modifying consumer-generated WhatsApp payloads to advertise the fork author\u0027s channel.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16473",
"modified": "2026-09-23T09:07:47Z",
"published": "2026-09-23T09:07:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/sea-baileys/v/1.0.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in sea-baileys (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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Related by attack behaviour
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