MAL-2026-16470
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (db0813755b79e157c644502848b1ff5af003fc82fb842b39676490d00f33e814)
The package's exports field maps the ./package.json subpath to setup.js, so any consumer resolving require('z-deno-truth-bwhlsz/package.json') executes JavaScript instead of reading the manifest. setup.js writes a Deno/Hono handler to /tmp/h.tsx that reads /readflag, /flagserver, /app/backdoor.tsx, and /entrypoint.sh from the host filesystem and returns their contents in the HTTP response, matching on a hitcon{...} pattern. The exports subpath hijack turns routine package-metadata resolution into arbitrary code execution on the installer, and the dropped file is a shipped exfiltration handler intended to be picked up by a Deno server on the host. While the file-read targets are specific to a CTF environment, the delivery mechanism (subpath hijack + filesystem drop) executes on any host that resolves the package's ./package.json subpath.
Source: ghsa-malware (b89fbde3be8da5aea0248c87b80d27aea1519fc5bb124d34bce0443ee7fd64ad)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "setup.js",
"sha256": "1b467f2aa0b668b5f8f095c94c5abf28995e49e3a323c8e2a7ca850cf9c8a251",
"tlsh": "7141d2580876022ceb2391edabdf21647266f3c37018eaf9b98d87551f085e0a5d67e8"
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "z-deno-truth-bwhlsz"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.0.0",
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"GHSA-f8xr-gjfq-xfcp"
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "GHSA-f8xr-gjfq-xfcp",
"import_time": "2026-09-23T05:26:12.564180001Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-23T05:19:36Z",
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"sha256": "b89fbde3be8da5aea0248c87b80d27aea1519fc5bb124d34bce0443ee7fd64ad",
"source": "ghsa-malware"
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020486",
"import_time": "2026-09-23T09:20:27.794968578Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-23T09:08:22Z",
"sha256": "db0813755b79e157c644502848b1ff5af003fc82fb842b39676490d00f33e814",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"2.0.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020485",
"import_time": "2026-09-23T09:20:27.760839533Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-23T09:08:13Z",
"sha256": "ea474ef0f05914096e1ab4606f3ce95c9d332dc393389824f79ff05c9a1fede5",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (db0813755b79e157c644502848b1ff5af003fc82fb842b39676490d00f33e814)\nThe package\u0027s `exports` field maps the `./package.json` subpath to `setup.js`, so any consumer resolving `require(\u0027z-deno-truth-bwhlsz/package.json\u0027)` executes JavaScript instead of reading the manifest. `setup.js` writes a Deno/Hono handler to `/tmp/h.tsx` that reads `/readflag`, `/flagserver`, `/app/backdoor.tsx`, and `/entrypoint.sh` from the host filesystem and returns their contents in the HTTP response, matching on a `hitcon{...}` pattern. The exports subpath hijack turns routine package-metadata resolution into arbitrary code execution on the installer, and the dropped file is a shipped exfiltration handler intended to be picked up by a Deno server on the host. While the file-read targets are specific to a CTF environment, the delivery mechanism (subpath hijack + filesystem drop) executes on any host that resolves the package\u0027s `./package.json` subpath.\n\n## Source: ghsa-malware (b89fbde3be8da5aea0248c87b80d27aea1519fc5bb124d34bce0443ee7fd64ad)\nAny computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16470",
"modified": "2026-09-23T09:22:31.986336047Z",
"published": "2026-09-23T05:08:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f8xr-gjfq-xfcp"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/z-deno-truth-bwhlsz/v/2.0.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/z-deno-truth-bwhlsz/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in z-deno-truth-bwhlsz (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.