MAL-2026-16461
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (a22893c200272af03998e9f6c5df91c6e4971b3d2622a80df8eab58b98e0a9a1)
cdp_inject.js is declared as the package main and unconditionally calls main() at module top level when the process is not invoked with --stop/--detach, so simply requiring the package starts a loop that polls http://127.0.0.1:9222/json for Chrome DevTools targets, attaches over CDP, and injects a script into every page. The injected code captures document.body.innerText and the active editor's contents, base64-encodes them, and POSTs the payload to the hardcoded HTTPS endpoint ai-script.test0ing7.workers.dev, a generic Cloudflare Workers subdomain unrelated to any declared publisher (author field blank, README effectively empty). The destination is not caller-configurable. The module also sets process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED='0' at load time, disabling certificate verification for the entire Node process including this outbound relay. A live-looking third-party Groq API key (gsk_...) is embedded in keyPool and shipped in cleartext to every installer, and a --stop mode shells out to taskkill /F /IM node.exe, terminating every Node process on Windows rather than only this tool.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "cdp_inject.js",
"sha256": "36cda76bbf7396ceb3cc6317680c60edaf9809787805a678f7fe9a97c7635ba0",
"tlsh": "b792c58a64a6213585b6b3b98f539515f73ad033710143b4fd5c86982ff287482b6fcd"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "godxxx-1.0.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "46d0b0303949f8cb3ed90512c91449a19b06d8c1",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-XBZalThlk5E0ct+4KPZsEQuYnpzSNzHJ3cT9/4LDBoME3dtFLZH7Pa5Fd8N/X3YVfgrrBpZTeUigGOO0AQtKkg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "godxxx"
},
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020456",
"import_time": "2026-09-23T05:18:35.301665918Z",
"modified_time": "2026-09-23T04:48:57Z",
"sha256": "a22893c200272af03998e9f6c5df91c6e4971b3d2622a80df8eab58b98e0a9a1",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (a22893c200272af03998e9f6c5df91c6e4971b3d2622a80df8eab58b98e0a9a1)\ncdp_inject.js is declared as the package main and unconditionally calls main() at module top level when the process is not invoked with --stop/--detach, so simply requiring the package starts a loop that polls http://127.0.0.1:9222/json for Chrome DevTools targets, attaches over CDP, and injects a script into every page. The injected code captures document.body.innerText and the active editor\u0027s contents, base64-encodes them, and POSTs the payload to the hardcoded HTTPS endpoint ai-script.test0ing7.workers.dev, a generic Cloudflare Workers subdomain unrelated to any declared publisher (author field blank, README effectively empty). The destination is not caller-configurable. The module also sets process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=\u00270\u0027 at load time, disabling certificate verification for the entire Node process including this outbound relay. A live-looking third-party Groq API key (gsk_...) is embedded in keyPool and shipped in cleartext to every installer, and a --stop mode shells out to `taskkill /F /IM node.exe`, terminating every Node process on Windows rather than only this tool.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-16461",
"modified": "2026-09-23T04:48:57Z",
"published": "2026-09-23T04:48:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/godxxx/v/1.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in godxxx (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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