Vulnerability-Lookup

MAL-2026-15817

Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages

Published

2026-09-02 03:58

Modified

2026-09-02 03:58

Summary

Malicious code in peertube-plugin-poc-marker (npm)

Details

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (ff307f6227ac4a9217a899b419a6931ddfe0376cb0cc6ba3570c0f589247241c)

index.js runs id; uname -a; hostname; date -u; ls -d /var/www/peertube via execSync when PeerTube invokes the plugin's register() hook, then POSTs the combined stdout as JSON to the hardcoded bare-IP collector http://103.38.237.204:8444/poc over plaintext HTTP. The same reconnaissance output is also written into a poc_proof plugin setting registered with private: false, providing a second read-back channel via the PeerTube public settings API. The destination host is not configurable, is unrelated to the plugin's declared PeerTube purpose, and captures the host's user, kernel, hostname, and PeerTube install path from the server on which the plugin is loaded.

CWE

CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.

Credits

Amazon Inspector inspector-research@amazon.com

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "cwes": [
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          }
        ],
        "indicators": {
          "evidence_files": [
            {
              "path": "index.js",
              "sha256": "6a8ed05fac49ed2ad33c8cd12475fba50bdd971e3daa0ce8d50129e51f4edd7b",
              "tlsh": "8c3153da51f8a379dbc2b4fcf24b11525223e24e26048d95f2dc17702b0f5a882b1af4"
            }
          ],
          "package_integrity": [
            {
              "filename": "peertube-plugin-poc-marker-1.0.0.tgz",
              "hashes": {
                "sha1": "f87067de5e84faa63af0b5186a9ed6c616c78a5f",
                "sha512_sri": "sha512-/UX0eWTUFp4x7536CGAlZqNG8m/TrVBlHkJkqG2k9H8NRL+lf3XrwodIEQTdVFSC8sFXM/sN9lz7uDe5V7GWsw=="
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "peertube-plugin-poc-marker"
      },
      "versions": [
        "1.0.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "inspector-research@amazon.com"
      ],
      "name": "Amazon Inspector",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-019331",
        "import_time": "2026-09-02T04:23:33.662929457Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-09-02T03:58:06Z",
        "sha256": "ff307f6227ac4a9217a899b419a6931ddfe0376cb0cc6ba3570c0f589247241c",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "1.0.0"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (ff307f6227ac4a9217a899b419a6931ddfe0376cb0cc6ba3570c0f589247241c)\nindex.js runs `id; uname -a; hostname; date -u; ls -d /var/www/peertube` via execSync when PeerTube invokes the plugin\u0027s register() hook, then POSTs the combined stdout as JSON to the hardcoded bare-IP collector http://103.38.237.204:8444/poc over plaintext HTTP. The same reconnaissance output is also written into a `poc_proof` plugin setting registered with `private: false`, providing a second read-back channel via the PeerTube public settings API. The destination host is not configurable, is unrelated to the plugin\u0027s declared PeerTube purpose, and captures the host\u0027s user, kernel, hostname, and PeerTube install path from the server on which the plugin is loaded.\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-15817",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T03:58:06Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T03:58:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/peertube-plugin-poc-marker/v/1.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in peertube-plugin-poc-marker (npm)"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted