MAL-2026-13626
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-08-07 17:31
Modified
2026-08-07 17:31
Summary
Malicious code in @mrbenty8jf1p9y5/oidc-bind-canary (npm)
Details

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (1a9ed4acf296e53ad5955f759a0f0692d641781b1bd4e67ada1c116216f96fc3)

The package's postinstall lifecycle script issues an HTTPS request from the installer's machine to a Cloudflare tunnel at wiki-shared-carlos-exempt.trycloudflare.com on path /token-capture. The request is sent with the Host header spoofed to dependabot-api.githubapp.com and with TLS certificate validation disabled (rejectUnauthorized:false), disguising the callout as legitimate GitHub Dependabot traffic. The destination path name (/token-capture) and the disguise mechanics indicate an install-time beacon to an attacker-controlled listener, firing automatically on npm install.

CWE
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
Credits

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "cwes": [
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          }
        ],
        "indicators": {
          "evidence_files": [
            {
              "path": "postinstall.js",
              "sha256": "cdb27a1934933dcb25f9a6a9c4ae00853af9f4c464486990380b47bfb526b977",
              "tlsh": "5601eff108e581140df3c5c6605f6277b4238104f849e4a4f6d8839f6fcb859c1178bc"
            }
          ],
          "package_integrity": [
            {
              "filename": "oidc-bind-canary-0.0.3.tgz",
              "hashes": {
                "sha1": "616f8a3058b7ce9f77764ac1d04b49cdcdae34bd",
                "sha512_sri": "sha512-+rRUwBXtV9PCak2vAVVCAJMJxGg7riDmJ+5eeNAPFqLOjXyoaGM4jicpBQ0Kb2g4pdZumB0sK37kkd1wz2wEuw=="
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@mrbenty8jf1p9y5/oidc-bind-canary"
      },
      "versions": [
        "0.0.3"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "inspector-research@amazon.com"
      ],
      "name": "Amazon Inspector",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-017133",
        "import_time": "2026-08-07T17:51:00.21610457Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-08-07T17:31:24Z",
        "sha256": "1a9ed4acf296e53ad5955f759a0f0692d641781b1bd4e67ada1c116216f96fc3",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "0.0.3"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1a9ed4acf296e53ad5955f759a0f0692d641781b1bd4e67ada1c116216f96fc3)\nThe package\u0027s postinstall lifecycle script issues an HTTPS request from the installer\u0027s machine to a Cloudflare tunnel at wiki-shared-carlos-exempt.trycloudflare.com on path /token-capture. The request is sent with the Host header spoofed to dependabot-api.githubapp.com and with TLS certificate validation disabled (rejectUnauthorized:false), disguising the callout as legitimate GitHub Dependabot traffic. The destination path name (/token-capture) and the disguise mechanics indicate an install-time beacon to an attacker-controlled listener, firing automatically on npm install.\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-13626",
  "modified": "2026-08-07T17:31:24Z",
  "published": "2026-08-07T17:31:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@mrbenty8jf1p9y5/oidc-bind-canary/v/0.0.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in @mrbenty8jf1p9y5/oidc-bind-canary (npm)"
}



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