MAL-2026-13610
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (7f050d397c72fdb9336deba1e2ca6758d04625323e7bb4746d8b61964cc671ae)
The package's main entrypoint (index.js) and src/server.js start an HTTP + Socket.IO server bound to 0.0.0.0 and are designed to be published to the public internet via serveo.net / ngrok tunnels. On a spawn-shell socket.io message the server invokes pty.spawn(shell, [], { cwd: process.env.HOME... }) to start a local /bin/bash PTY and forwards subsequent shell-input websocket payloads into ptyProcess.write(data), giving any reachable network peer full-host command execution on the operator's machine. A parallel connect-ssh handler opens an SSH2 session to a caller-supplied host/user/password and pipes ssh-input websocket data into the SSH shell stream, with defaults pulled from SSH_HOST / SSH_USERNAME / SSH_PASSWORD env vars so any configured host credentials on the installer are used automatically. The web UI ships with hardcoded default credentials admin/admin, and the SSH-proxy socket.io namespace has no authentication gate at all. The child_process / spawn('ssh',...) primitives at src/server.js:210 and:639-641 corroborate the shell and SSH pivot paths.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "src/server.js",
"sha256": "67186c77e3faf39a3c7aa931be700cabe085d70808b87d4efe4b55384a0c9f9d",
"tlsh": "89b20e7468b7102871b7e45e8f2b44063627b5033149db40bbac77902fded689ae1bf9"
},
{
"path": "index.js",
"sha256": "b7aebba7c77c02360f2f11af3253aebef400dbda222334ed2b523f71a0e3c122",
"tlsh": "83c1950469f6203622b3a55ade5bc0073633f5033206eb40775cd79a6fd19a89792bfc"
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "f-termx"
},
"versions": [
"1.2.6"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-017081",
"import_time": "2026-08-07T14:26:54.433735615Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-07T13:42:35Z",
"sha256": "7f050d397c72fdb9336deba1e2ca6758d04625323e7bb4746d8b61964cc671ae",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.2.6"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (7f050d397c72fdb9336deba1e2ca6758d04625323e7bb4746d8b61964cc671ae)\nThe package\u0027s main entrypoint (index.js) and src/server.js start an HTTP + Socket.IO server bound to 0.0.0.0 and are designed to be published to the public internet via serveo.net / ngrok tunnels. On a `spawn-shell` socket.io message the server invokes `pty.spawn(shell, [], { cwd: process.env.HOME... })` to start a local `/bin/bash` PTY and forwards subsequent `shell-input` websocket payloads into `ptyProcess.write(data)`, giving any reachable network peer full-host command execution on the operator\u0027s machine. A parallel `connect-ssh` handler opens an SSH2 session to a caller-supplied host/user/password and pipes `ssh-input` websocket data into the SSH shell stream, with defaults pulled from `SSH_HOST` / `SSH_USERNAME` / `SSH_PASSWORD` env vars so any configured host credentials on the installer are used automatically. The web UI ships with hardcoded default credentials `admin/admin`, and the SSH-proxy socket.io namespace has no authentication gate at all. The `child_process` / `spawn(\u0027ssh\u0027,...)` primitives at src/server.js:210 and:639-641 corroborate the shell and SSH pivot paths.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-13610",
"modified": "2026-08-07T13:42:35Z",
"published": "2026-08-07T13:42:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/f-termx/v/1.2.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in f-termx (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.