MAL-2026-13599
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (5c6a49e10172c9781161b964655fc6720e845ddf2049f0cfdbb39464946dbcd7)
On require() the package fetches a platform-specific executable from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf10{0..3}-*.workers.dev, host strings assembled by joining split literals to evade static analysis), with a fallback that reassembles a base64 payload from DNS TXT records under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The binary is written to a temp file disguised as OS diagnostics output ('dotnet_diag_.exe' on Windows, '.cache_' elsewhere), chmod'd 0755, and spawned detached and unref'd via cp.spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', filePath+' &']). The same drop-and-exec logic is duplicated in lib/telemetry.js (the package's declared main), ensuring execution even if bridge.js is bypassed. child_process is imported via string concatenation (require('child'+'process')) and fs.chmodSync via bracket-access to further evade pattern scanning. The module self-labels as 'telemetry/analytics' and gates the drop on DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT / DO_NOT_TRACK environment variables as a plausible-deniability cover; the actual behavior is fetch-and-execute of an attacker-controlled binary on the installer's host at import time.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "_bridge.js",
"sha256": "0d29d200ee9aebbe664ddb40d1d22a5be8e8180b8ea6e2abf0b1aa128c9c5ca4",
"tlsh": "dfa1855a1afe70180792e1d8452b5816719ee95333c4d8d4fb4ca6948f9a239c3b39fc"
},
{
"path": "lib/telemetry.js",
"sha256": "63c17973060ce316cbf3c7309bfe94d30671fe68d2e253a76673a8671d1b0240",
"tlsh": "5073304966fb10214263b0685fab40437635c4072a4eed5dba9c43ec9f8db3896f1fb9"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "dolyame-ui-sortablelist-35.8.1.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "b72c0d66b8dac3dc3838cb0a35de688933717baf",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-uVG4ThZVciIgrsa0RJCF4kvOQLnrDW5O7YBD6U2LVoQVOEjz40ObpUG0k+SeZ6cPEUC3FW7/nrcYGDXEbwIRcA=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "dolyame-ui-sortablelist"
},
"versions": [
"35.8.1"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-017011",
"import_time": "2026-08-07T12:51:22.096019516Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-07T12:30:51Z",
"sha256": "5c6a49e10172c9781161b964655fc6720e845ddf2049f0cfdbb39464946dbcd7",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"35.8.1"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (5c6a49e10172c9781161b964655fc6720e845ddf2049f0cfdbb39464946dbcd7)\nOn require() the package fetches a platform-specific executable from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers hosts (oob-worker.cf10{0..3}-*.workers.dev, host strings assembled by joining split literals to evade static analysis), with a fallback that reassembles a base64 payload from DNS TXT records under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, ext.dl.wel1.ru, pkg.dl.wel1.ru, and net.dl.wel1.ru. The binary is written to a temp file disguised as OS diagnostics output (\u0027dotnet_diag_\u003chex\u003e.exe\u0027 on Windows, \u0027.cache_\u003chex\u003e\u0027 elsewhere), chmod\u0027d 0755, and spawned detached and unref\u0027d via cp.spawn(\u0027/bin/sh\u0027, [\u0027-c\u0027, filePath+\u0027 \u0026\u0027]). The same drop-and-exec logic is duplicated in lib/telemetry.js (the package\u0027s declared main), ensuring execution even if _bridge.js is bypassed. child_process is imported via string concatenation (require(\u0027child_\u0027+\u0027process\u0027)) and fs.chmodSync via bracket-access to further evade pattern scanning. The module self-labels as \u0027telemetry/analytics\u0027 and gates the drop on DISABLE_TELEMETRY / ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT / DO_NOT_TRACK environment variables as a plausible-deniability cover; the actual behavior is fetch-and-execute of an attacker-controlled binary on the installer\u0027s host at import time.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-13599",
"modified": "2026-08-07T12:30:51Z",
"published": "2026-08-07T12:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/dolyame-ui-sortablelist/v/35.8.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in dolyame-ui-sortablelist (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.