MAL-2026-13596
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (e109a79a8ebbb2a7d21a37668b162bc92a5602ad24e7db6b6ce711f5cee152f6)
On require, index.js loads shim.js which fetches a platform-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT-record base64 fallback under .dl.wel1.ru, writes the payload to a temp path with a deceptive name (/var/tmp/.cache_ on Unix, %TEMP%\dotnet_diag*.exe on Windows), chmods it to 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. The main module lib/telemetry.js (styled as a Sentry-like SDK) contains a parallel dropper path that base64-decodes chunks fetched via DNS TXT failover, writes an 'extension' to disk, sets executable permissions, and spawns it detached — giving a second import-time trigger if the shim path fails. Both files obfuscate the host names and sensitive API references by concatenating string fragments (e.g. ["oob-worker.cf10","1-adf.worke","rs.de","v"].join(""), require("child"+"process"), fs["chmod"+"Sync"]) to evade static scanners. The behavior is framed as 'telemetry' with token opt-out env checks but there is no legitimate telemetry function: the sole effect on require is remote binary retrieval and execution on the installer's host.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "_shim.js",
"sha256": "f9968874643d51f7cc28ad8c7877b91975b184fb62786dd2679ba5386003fcfe",
"tlsh": "69a1a85617fa30180792e5d8852f9816719bf69333c4e5c4fb4c6a944fea12883b39ed"
},
{
"path": "lib/telemetry.js",
"sha256": "dc1f2f2475eb808f862119b0a02e1ecd0c54cdd0d86d75e0245a70e6ee478d92",
"tlsh": "d673304966fb10214263b0685ebb40437635c4072a4eed5dba9c43ec9f8db3896f1fb9"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "dolyame-ui-progressline-35.8.1.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "64d5f8ef03dd44b8a437f06257650ab70f9f3f02",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-NCmvEVCMPM8tovFOb7OJ1gbrjDxqWpSiucW3C29nr22naWBWghMdA97Zmk0nD79guLFQDQgo/+JU130Yp1mXnQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "dolyame-ui-progressline"
},
"versions": [
"35.8.1"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-017039",
"import_time": "2026-08-07T12:51:23.338480596Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-07T12:35:03Z",
"sha256": "e109a79a8ebbb2a7d21a37668b162bc92a5602ad24e7db6b6ce711f5cee152f6",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"35.8.1"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e109a79a8ebbb2a7d21a37668b162bc92a5602ad24e7db6b6ce711f5cee152f6)\nOn require, index.js loads _shim.js which fetches a platform-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare Workers endpoints (oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT-record base64 fallback under *.dl.wel1.ru, writes the payload to a temp path with a deceptive name (/var/tmp/.cache_* on Unix, %TEMP%\\dotnet_diag_*.exe on Windows), chmods it to 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe. The main module lib/telemetry.js (styled as a Sentry-like SDK) contains a parallel dropper path that base64-decodes chunks fetched via DNS TXT failover, writes an \u0027extension\u0027 to disk, sets executable permissions, and spawns it detached \u2014 giving a second import-time trigger if the _shim path fails. Both files obfuscate the host names and sensitive API references by concatenating string fragments (e.g. [\"oob-worker.cf10\",\"1-adf.worke\",\"rs.de\",\"v\"].join(\"\"), require(\"child_\"+\"process\"), fs[\"chmod\"+\"Sync\"]) to evade static scanners. The behavior is framed as \u0027telemetry\u0027 with token opt-out env checks but there is no legitimate telemetry function: the sole effect on require is remote binary retrieval and execution on the installer\u0027s host.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-13596",
"modified": "2026-08-07T12:35:03Z",
"published": "2026-08-07T12:35:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/dolyame-ui-progressline/v/35.8.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in dolyame-ui-progressline (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.