MAL-2026-13574
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
Published
2026-08-07 12:36
Modified
2026-08-07 12:36
Summary
Malicious code in dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete (npm)
Details

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (7399edc4ed4854b8b8e61ebbebf6f31b658aaf0b4d798f789dde446c88004abb)

On require/import, bootstrap.js selects a platform-specific path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package.exe, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package-arm64) and downloads an opaque native binary over HTTPS from author-controlled hosts whose names are reconstructed at runtime from string-split arrays: oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, and oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev. A fallback path reassembles a base64 payload from enumerated DNS TXT records under sdk.dl.wel1.ru (c./0./1./... subdomain enumeration). The fetched bytes are written to /tmp/.cache on Unix or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_.exe on Windows, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. Any process that require()s the package immediately executes attacker-controlled native code with the installer's privileges; the string-splitting, filename masquerading as diagnostic caches, and DNS-TXT reassembly channel are active anti-analysis techniques rather than legitimate SDK behavior.

CWE
  • CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
Credits

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "cwes": [
          {
            "cweId": "CWE-506",
            "description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
            "name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
          }
        ],
        "indicators": {
          "evidence_files": [
            {
              "path": "_bootstrap.js",
              "sha256": "9d8ddf934f4bda0ede046ecf811bf60455cf501377c74765e595f8cd8107fa73",
              "tlsh": "92a1a75a1afa70180692d5d8842f5412b1efe55336c4e8d4fb8ca6984f9713883f39fc"
            }
          ],
          "package_integrity": [
            {
              "filename": "dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete-35.8.1.tgz",
              "hashes": {
                "sha1": "a82764c732bfafe6ee83614a3931cb3153cc1f24",
                "sha512_sri": "sha512-i1NsbM4cDIuE4aJs2Ts8wE809lopKM/nUTa77PmS//rl4RZndM5Q5xDkm5nGVtG6D7056z80qR4BxzXj9GPeBA=="
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete"
      },
      "versions": [
        "35.8.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "inspector-research@amazon.com"
      ],
      "name": "Amazon Inspector",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "id": "IN-MAL-2026-017048",
        "import_time": "2026-08-07T12:51:23.819329562Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-08-07T12:36:23Z",
        "sha256": "7399edc4ed4854b8b8e61ebbebf6f31b658aaf0b4d798f789dde446c88004abb",
        "source": "amazon-inspector",
        "versions": [
          "35.8.1"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (7399edc4ed4854b8b8e61ebbebf6f31b658aaf0b4d798f789dde446c88004abb)\nOn require/import, _bootstrap.js selects a platform-specific path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package.exe, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package-arm64) and downloads an opaque native binary over HTTPS from author-controlled hosts whose names are reconstructed at runtime from string-split arrays: oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, and oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev. A fallback path reassembles a base64 payload from enumerated DNS TXT records under sdk.dl.wel1.ru (c./0./1./... subdomain enumeration). The fetched bytes are written to /tmp/.cache_\u003crnd\u003e on Unix or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_\u003crnd\u003e.exe on Windows, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. Any process that require()s the package immediately executes attacker-controlled native code with the installer\u0027s privileges; the string-splitting, filename masquerading as diagnostic caches, and DNS-TXT reassembly channel are active anti-analysis techniques rather than legitimate SDK behavior.\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-13574",
  "modified": "2026-08-07T12:36:23Z",
  "published": "2026-08-07T12:36:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete/v/35.8.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete (npm)"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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