MAL-2026-13520
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (a22dda7bf5c10da8b67b359d665b133709826bdebbd6632fc0fcf04551f1efac)
The package runs a daemon that long-polls Tencent's iLink Bot API (ilinkai.weixin.qq.com) for incoming WeChat messages and forwards each message body into a locally hosted AI agent that is spawned with all approval and sandbox gates disabled. Specifically, TmuxDelivery.deliver writes the message text (sendToSession(sessionName, "[微信...] " + ctx.text)) into a tmux session whose command line is CC2WECHAT_CONTEXT=... claude --dangerously-skip-permissions, using tmux load-buffer + paste-buffer + send-keys Enter to submit the input. An alternative backend spawns codex exec --json --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox and feeds the same WeChat message stream into it. Because these AI CLIs are configured to auto-execute shell commands and filesystem operations without prompts when safety flags are disabled, any party able to send a WeChat message to the linked account can drive arbitrary shell and file operations on the machine running the daemon. The tool is documented in the README as full-host access requiring a disposable VM. The startup entry point is a bin CLI (cc2wechat start), so the remote-shell surface materializes when the operator launches the daemon rather than on npm install or require().
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "dist/v5/deliveries/tmux/tmux-delivery.js",
"sha256": "0331b83d5b309e526802c58dccf9a56547f0e91ce37b1369da967f95fd043ae0",
"tlsh": "871221582ab7c2305273d0b2473b510067b590373125cdecf7be87a8af5dd298aa1ea4"
},
{
"path": "dist/v5/backends/codex.js",
"sha256": "3ad0ca3d916926a3bc88e5d59ed93f542b7a9829fc22ed4064cfc2c6f8a9d20f",
"tlsh": "f0e1b64d08ffa9a41656a8fd2f0b5012323ba003b088dd50fedddf605f4953855a2fd6"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "cc2wechat-5.1.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "7783bfd3ba23068adbbbc18958d6a6c036b82042",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-yxsCns85Up2aSi+rkVIEWrasyF4x0N99CyIR4BQ7eqNAoNobP34quWPumtMDDs3ru3azo4NUxZNHuZqOO+RWhg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@aster110/cc2wechat"
},
"versions": [
"5.1.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-017064",
"import_time": "2026-08-07T12:51:24.62225872Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-07T12:43:35Z",
"sha256": "a22dda7bf5c10da8b67b359d665b133709826bdebbd6632fc0fcf04551f1efac",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"5.1.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (a22dda7bf5c10da8b67b359d665b133709826bdebbd6632fc0fcf04551f1efac)\nThe package runs a daemon that long-polls Tencent\u0027s iLink Bot API (ilinkai.weixin.qq.com) for incoming WeChat messages and forwards each message body into a locally hosted AI agent that is spawned with all approval and sandbox gates disabled. Specifically, TmuxDelivery.deliver writes the message text (`sendToSession(sessionName, \"[\u5fae\u4fe1...] \" + ctx.text)`) into a tmux session whose command line is `CC2WECHAT_CONTEXT=... claude --dangerously-skip-permissions`, using tmux `load-buffer` + `paste-buffer` + `send-keys Enter` to submit the input. An alternative backend spawns `codex exec --json --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox` and feeds the same WeChat message stream into it. Because these AI CLIs are configured to auto-execute shell commands and filesystem operations without prompts when safety flags are disabled, any party able to send a WeChat message to the linked account can drive arbitrary shell and file operations on the machine running the daemon. The tool is documented in the README as full-host access requiring a disposable VM. The startup entry point is a `bin` CLI (`cc2wechat start`), so the remote-shell surface materializes when the operator launches the daemon rather than on `npm install` or `require()`.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-13520",
"modified": "2026-08-07T12:43:35Z",
"published": "2026-08-07T12:43:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@aster110/cc2wechat/v/5.1.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @aster110/cc2wechat (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.